Bulletin of the World Health Organization

Oseltamivir storage, distribution and dispensing following the 2009 H1N1 influenza outbreak in Mexico

Luis Meave Gutiérrez-Mendoza, Brian Schwartz, José de Jesús Méndez de Lira & Veronika J Wirtz

Volume 90, Number 10, October 2012, 782-787

Table 1. Compliance with the national pandemic preparedness plan for influenza in Mexico between April and May 2009, according to key informants interviewed

Antiviral stockpile supply stage Information provided or not provided Compliance/non-compliance during first month of the influenza outbreak Positive implications of compliance/non-compliance Negative implications of compliance/non-compliance
Purchase and storage No information on the type of preparation to be purchased Stockpiled oseltamivir only as bulk Compared with capsules, bulk powder is cheaper, requires less storage space and has a longer shelf-life while not reconstituted Lack of required infrastructure and financial and human resources during outbreak
No information on the quantities of antivirals needed Oseltamivir in bulk covered 1.28% of Mexico’s population. Criteria for quantity purchased unknown to key informants Less expense if population coverage low Uncertainty about priority groups requiring antivirals first
Recommended purchasing a mix of antiviral drugs Contrary to the national pandemic preparedness plan, only one antiviral (oseltamivir phosphate in bulk) was purchased for stockpile. Less expense than if two or more alternative drugs are stored No alternative treatment available for cases with resistance to oseltamivir
Recommended decentralized storage Contrary to the national pandemic preparedness plan, the strategic stockpile was only centrally stored Less expense if stockpile centrally stored 11-day delay in drug distribution during outbreak
Distribution from the central level to the states Recommended delivery of the bulk product to each state Contrary to the national pandemic preparedness plan, bulk powder was not delivered to the states Central control over the production of oral suspension from bulk powder Loss of vital time in distributing strategic stockpile
Reconstitution of bulk powder not explained An appropriate site for reconstituting the bulk powder had to be found and the reconstitution process had to be developed Support from Roche and the National Medicines Regulatory Authority in developing the reconstitution process Loss of vital time in distributing strategic stockpile
Distribution criteria not defined Priority given to health-care professionals, military personnel, patients hospitalized at the National Reference Centre for Respiratory Diseases and members of the National Congress and Ministry of Health No public outcry over distribution criteria No clear prioritization criteria and ad hoc decisions without prior stakeholder agreement
Distribution within San Luis Potosí Not described The Ministry of Health designed the distribution ad hoc during the first 4 weeks of the outbreak. Two outlets at the primary care level dispensed oseltamivir to anyone with a medical prescription No need for coordination with the private sector, which was perceived as difficult by key informants Complete reliance on the public sector and delays in distribution in this sector affected both private and public sector patients
Prescription within San Luis Potosí Not described The health ministry in San Luis Potosí designed its own guidelines and adapted them according to the availability of antivirals State control over the use of antivirals Impossible to cover everyone with influenza-like illness from the start of the outbreak; prescription guidelines changed in conformity with drug availability
Dispensing within San Luis Potosí Not described The health ministry in San Luis Potosí decided to set up two dispensing outlets at the primary care level for patients with influenza-like illness in the public or private sector State control over the dispensing of antivirals Supply bottlenecks in the public sector affected both private and public sector patients