

# DRAFT APPROACH FOR THE PREVENTION AND MANAGEMENT OF CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN THE POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NUTRITION PROGRAMMES AT COUNTRY LEVEL

## INTRODUCTORY PAPER<sup>12</sup>

### 1. BACKGROUND

In 2012, the Sixty-fifth World Health Assembly adopted resolution WHA65.6, in which it endorsed the comprehensive implementation plan on maternal, infant and young child nutrition. The first priority action of the implementation plan is to create a supportive environment for the implementation of comprehensive food and nutrition policies, while the resolution urged Member States, among other things, to establish a dialogue with relevant national and international parties, and form alliances and partnerships to expand nutrition actions and introduce adequate mechanisms to safeguard against potential conflicts of interest.

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<sup>1</sup> **Acknowledgments.** This document has been developed by Hala Boukerdenna, WHO technical officer under the supervision of Francesco Branca, director of the WHO department of Nutrition for Health and Development. We gratefully acknowledge the technical contribution of the following consultants: Peter Adams, Faculty of Medical and Health Sciences, University of Auckland; Jeff Collin, School of Social and Political Sciences, Edinburgh University; Vivica Kraak, Department of Nutrition, Foods and Exercise, Virginia Tech University; Melissa Mialon, Health Sciences Department, York University; Gary Sacks, WHO Collaborating Centre for Obesity Prevention, Deakin University; Boyd Swinburn, Faculty of Medical and Health Sciences, University of Auckland. Thanks to Angela Carriedo, Ann Louise Lie, Katharina Jungo and Valentina Paderi, WHO interns. We would like to thank the following WHO staff for reviewing the document: Ahmed Ogwel and Hanna Todd (Global Coordination Mechanism on NCDs); Andreas Mlitzke and Marie Bombin (department of Compliance, Risk Management and Ethics ); David Clarke (department of Health Governance and Financing); Deirdre Dimancesco (department of Essential Medicines and Health Products); Gaudenz Silberschmidt and Loubna Al-Atlassi (department of Partnerships and Non-State Actors ); Issa Matta (Office of the Legal Counsel ); Jude Osei (department of Prevention of Non-Communicable Diseases); Lawrence Grummer-Strawn (department of Nutrition for Health and Development); Marcus Stahlhofer (department of Maternal, Newborn, Child and Adolescent Health). Special thanks are extended to the WHO nutrition regional advisers: Ayoub Al-Jawaldeh (EMRO), Angela De Silva (SEARO), Katrin Engelhardt (WPRO), Fabio Gomes Da Silva (AMRO/PAHO), Adelheid Onyango (AFRO) and Joao Rodrigues Da Silva Breda (EURO). We thank Timothy Armstrong (department of Governing Bodies) and Menno Van Hilten (office of the Assistant Director General, Non-Communicable disease and Mental health) for advice on process issues. We also thank Fabienne Maertens, Jo-Ann Muriel and Marie-Christine Jolly (department of Nutrition for Health and Development) for administrative assistance throughout the project.

<sup>2</sup> **Declarations of interest.** Declarations of interest were requested from all the consultants who participated in the development of the document and all external persons invited to review the document, in compliance with the WHO policy. None of the individuals participating in the development or review of the document had any conflicts of interest to declare.

Resolution WHA65.6 also requested the Director-General to develop risk assessment, disclosure and management tools to safeguard against possible conflicts of interest in policy development and implementation of nutrition programmes consistent with WHO's overall policy and practice.

Furthermore, in decision WHA67(9) (2014), the Director-General was requested to convene informal consultations with Member States to complete the work, before the end of 2015, on risk assessment and management tools for conflicts of interest in nutrition, for consideration by Member States at the Sixty-ninth World Health Assembly.

In response to that request, the Secretariat convened a technical consultation, held in Geneva on 8 and 9 October 2015, on addressing and managing conflicts of interest in the planning and delivery of nutrition programmes at country level. The technical consultation brought together experts from different fields, such as, nutrition, health systems, noncommunicable diseases, the law, economics and the social sciences. Diverse stakeholders, including representatives of the six WHO regions, experts from non-State actors and multistakeholder initiatives, academic researchers, lawyers and experts from other organizations of the United Nations system working in the area of partnerships, also participated. Member States were invited to oversee the process as observers.

Following up on the outcomes of the technical consultation, the Secretariat devised a draft approach on preventing and managing conflicts of interest in policy development and implementation of nutrition programmes at country level. The approach proposes a methodology for Member States to consider in their engagement with individuals and non-State actors<sup>3</sup> for preventing and managing conflicts of interest in the area of nutrition. The approach targets government officials involved in the development, design and implementation of public health nutrition policies and programmes.

## **2. SCOPE AND AUDIENCE**

The approach proposes a methodology, composed of an introductory paper with general principles and typologies of engagement and a tool. Member States may consider following this approach in their engagement with individuals and non-State actors ("external actors") for the prevention and management of conflicts of interest (COI) in the area of nutrition. The approach targets government officials involved in the development, design, and implementation of public health nutrition policies and programmes.

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<sup>3</sup> For the purpose of the WHO Framework of Engagement with non-State Actors non-State actors are nongovernmental organizations, private sector entities, philanthropic foundations and academic institutions (see document WHA69/2016/REC/1, Annex 5).

### **3. PROCESS OF DEVELOPMENT**

In order to develop the proposed approach, WHO has considered different procedures and practices for preventing and managing conflicts of interest, including those adopted by organizations of the United Nations system, governmental bodies, non-State actors and health professional organizations. WHO has also reviewed the scientific literature on conflicts of interest in the drafting of policies for noncommunicable diseases, covering categories of conflict of interest, non-State actors and individuals, purposes and forms of engagement, and comparison of corporate tactics in the tobacco and food and beverage industries.

COI prevention and management guidance and tools were reviewed from the following entities:

- (a) WHO (guidance for WHO's engagement with institutions and individuals; guidance for country level interactions tobacco and pharmaceuticals );
- (b) UN agencies members of the UN Standing Committee on Nutrition (UNSCN)<sup>4</sup> and UN Development Programme (UNDP);
- (c) National governments (consulting information contained in the databases of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and World Bank (WB) and other documents);
- (d) WHO Collaborating Centres focusing on nutrition;
- (e) NGOs in official relations with WHO focusing on nutrition;
- (f) Health professional organizations;
- (g) Multi-stakeholder initiatives focusing on nutrition and NCDs.

Reviews of the scientific literature on the following topics were performed:

- (a) Processes and critiques on COI for NCD policy development;
- (b) Categories of COI, non-State actors and individuals, purpose and forms of engagement;
- (c) Corporate tactics from the food and beverage industries;
- (d) Country case studies.

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<sup>4</sup> Members of UNSCN include: Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO); International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD); United Nations Special Rapporteur on the right to food; UN System Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB); UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA); UN Environmental Programme (UNEP); United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF); United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN-DESA); United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); UN Women; World Food Programme (WFP); World Health Organization (WHO). Biodiversity International is an associate member.

The proposed approach has been developed in line with WHO's overall policies and practices including, *inter alia*, the WHO Framework of Engagement with non-State Actors.<sup>5</sup> The approach also acknowledges the differences and specificities in addressing conflicts of interest in the area of nutrition at country level.

A public consultation on the draft approach was held between 11 and 29 September 2017. Member States, United Nations representatives, non-State actors and the participants of the 2015 technical consultation provided comments, which are publicly available and were considered by the Secretariat in the current version of the approach.<sup>6</sup>

#### 4. TPOLOGIES

##### a. **Understanding COI**

- A **COI** arises in circumstances where there is potential for a secondary interest (a vested interest in the outcome of the government's work in the area of nutrition) to unduly influence, or where it may be reasonably perceived to unduly influence, either the independence or objectivity of professional judgement or actions regarding a primary interest (related to the government's work). The existence of COI in all its forms does not necessarily mean that improper action has occurred, but rather that there is risk of improper action occurring COI is not only financial but can take other forms as well (Adapted from WHO, 2016b).
- An **institutional COI describes** a situation where a government's primary interest, as reflected in its institutional mandate, to protect and promote public health, may be unduly influenced by the COI of a non-State actor in a way that affects, or may reasonably be perceived to affect, the independence and objectivity of the government's work. For a government, the potential risk of institutional COI could be highest in situations where the interest of non-State actors or individuals, in particular economic, commercial or financial, are not aligned with the government's public health policies, institutional mandate and interests. (Adapted from WHO , 2016b)
- An **Individual COI** can involve public officials or individuals that do not belong to the public administration. Individuals engaged in the development of nutrition policies, or implementation of nutrition programmes may experience a conflict if a private

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<sup>5</sup> See document WHA69/2016/REC/1, Annex 5.

<sup>6</sup> Feedback on the WHO consultation "Safeguarding against possible conflicts of interest in nutrition programmes: Approach for the prevention and management of conflicts of interest in the policy development and implementation of nutrition programmes at country level". In WHO/Nutrition [website]. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2017 (<http://www.who.int/nutrition/consultation-doi/comments/en/>, accessed 12 October 2017).

interest (financial, personal, or other non-governmental interest or commitment) interferes—or appears to interfere—with their ability to act impartially, discharge their functions or regulate their conduct in the sole interests of public health nutrition. A COI does not necessarily mean that the individual involved is actually conflicted: the perception of a COI alone may create a negative image. (Adapted from WHO, 2017a).

#### **b. Categories of individuals and non-State actors**

A COI can arise when interactions involve external actors of two distinct types: “non-State actors”; and “individuals” that may provide advice, expertise, or be otherwise associated with development of policies or the implementation of nutrition programmes.

For the purpose of this document, **individuals** are individuals belonging to the below-mentioned categories of non-State actors or act in their personal capacity.

For the purpose of this document, **non-State actors** can be: nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); private sector entities; philanthropic foundations; and academic institutions.

- **Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)** are non-profit entities that operate independently of governments. They are usually membership-based, with non-profit entities or individuals as members exercising voting rights in relation to the policies of the nongovernmental organization, or are otherwise constituted with non-profit, public-interest goals. They are free from concerns that are primarily of a private, commercial or profit-making nature. They could include, for example, grassroots community organizations, civil society groups and networks, faith-based organizations, professional groups, disease-specific groups, and patient groups. (WHO, 2016b)
- **Philanthropic foundations** are non-profit entities whose assets are provided by donors and whose income is spent on socially useful purposes. They shall be clearly independent from any private sector entity in their governance and decision-making. (WHO, 2016b)
- **Academic institutions** are entities engaged in the pursuit and dissemination of knowledge through research, education and training. (WHO, 2016b)
- **Private sector entities** are commercial enterprises, that is to say businesses, which are intended to make a profit for their owners. The term also refers to entities that represent, or are governed or controlled by, private sector entities. This group includes (but is not limited to) business associations representing commercial

enterprises, entities not “at arm’s length”<sup>7</sup> from their commercial sponsors, and partially or fully State-owned commercial enterprises acting like private sector entities.

An entity is considered to be **not at “arm’s length”** from another entity if it is dependent from the other entity, takes instructions from it and is clearly influenced, or reasonably perceived to be influenced, in its decisions and work by the other entity (Adapted from WHO, 2016b).

This concept should be taken into account in the risk assessment and management of COI since, when entity A is **not at “arm’s length”** from entity B (because it is dependent on or influenced by entity B), the government can decide to consider entity A as entity B for the purposes of assessing relevant risks and/or applying relevant provisions of its internal laws and procedures designed for engagement with entity B.

Although the term “at arm’s length” does not cover individuals, for the purpose of this document, the same concept is applied to them.

### c. Contributions, purpose and forms of engagement

- **Engagement** refers to any formalized interaction with the individual or non-State actor, ranging from a donation to a partnership.
  - **Contributions** refer to the resources that an external actor may provide when proposing to engage such as funding, delivery of in-kind goods and services, or providing technical expertise.
  - **Purpose of engagement** refers to the impact of the activity performed by the individual or non-State actor will have at different phases of the policy cycle (policy development, implementation and monitoring) (Kraak et al., 2014; Swinburn et al., 2015). The purpose for engagement may be to address an unmet need, to focus on specific under-resourced priorities, or to create synergy to add value to efforts to achieve a nutrition or public health goal (Alexander et al., 2015; CDC, 2014; Johnston et al., 2015; Kraak and Story, 2015; Kraak et al., 2012).
- **Appendix 1:** *Example of purpose of engagement according to the different phases of the policy cycle and activity performed by the external actors.*

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<sup>7</sup> An entity is considered “**at arm’s length**” from another entity if it is independent from the other entity, does not take instructions and is clearly not influenced or clearly not reasonably perceived to be influenced in its decisions and work by the other entity (WHO, 2016b).

- **Forms of engagement** are means or channels for shaping the purpose of engagement. The same purpose of engagement can be established through different forms: charitable (such as donations); transactional (such as sponsorships); and transformational (such as multistakeholder platforms) are described below.
- a) **Charitable:** Charitable engagements occur when non-State actors or individuals provide financial or material contribution to a governmental agency, either through an anonymous or acknowledged donation (Kraak et al., 2011; Prescott and Stibbe, 2017). It is important to stress that charity, in its strict definition, involves gifting or donating without expectations of return. However, evidence has shown that these practices may be used in some cases to influence policy-makers (Adams, 2016; Mialon et al., 2016). In this light, altruistic charity (as distinct from strategic charity) should be identified as different.
- b) **Transactional:** Transactional engagements occur when government and non-State actors or individuals combine their resources to achieve a given mission or goal. Examples of transactional engagements are contractual services, public-private partnerships or sponsorship. Transactional engagements involve more sustained interaction between government and non-State actors or individuals as well as higher levels of resources (Kraak et al., 2011; VicHealth, 2011).
- c) **Transformational:** Transformational engagements occur when governmental agencies and non-State actors or individuals establish networks to address large-scale social or political challenges. Examples of transformational engagements are multi-stakeholder platforms. Transformational engagements involve the highest level of interaction and resources, they usually have a broad scope of activity and are characterized by managerial complexity (Kraak et al., 2011; Prescott and Stibbe, 2017).

➤ **Appendix 2:** *Examples of forms of engagement.*

## **5. GENERAL PRINCIPLES**

### **(a) Overarching principles of engagement**

By applying the following overarching principles, a government's engagement with a non-State actor and individual may be successful if it:

1. conforms with the government's agendas and demonstrates a clear benefit to public health and nutrition;

2. respects the government's decision-making authority and leadership over the engagement in all settings;
3. does not compromise the government's integrity, independence and reputation;
4. is aligned and coherent with other government's policies and objectives, such as those related to NCDs and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs);
5. conforms with internationally recognized human rights standards the government is a State Party to;
6. is conducted on the basis of evidence, transparency, independent monitoring and accountability.

### **(b) Principles for prevention of COI**

#### **❖ Appropriateness of role (or activity)**

The appropriateness of the activity or role performed by the external actor can be conceptualized by assessing: (a) the alignment with the topic (or field) of engagement and (b) the existence of a commercial or other interest in the topic (or field) of engagement (Hawkins et al., 2014; Jernigan, 2012; Kearns et al., 2015)

COI are more likely to happen when the core business of the external actor (either as manufacturer or seller or promoter) is related to goods that contribute to unhealthy diet (non-aligned with public health nutrition goals) (Jernigan, 2009; Lyness et al., 2014; Tesler et al., 2008).

COI are less likely to happen with external actors whose core business is aligned with nutrition goals (e.g. promoting healthy lifestyles, such as insurance companies, sport items manufacturers, fruit and vegetable companies) or is not directly connected with the issues or topic, but nevertheless have critical resources to contribute, e.g. technology (Gomes, 2015; Prescott and Stibbe, 2017).

#### **➤ Appendix 3: Examples of the application of the "Appropriateness of roles" principle in the prevention COI.**

The second element to assess the appropriateness depends on the a specific phase of the policy cycle. Policy development and policy monitoring are sensitive phases of the policy cycle with regards to occurrence of COI.

Policy development consists of agenda setting, policy formulation and decision-making (Howlett et al., 2009). While acknowledging that all external actors may generate a COI, In this phase of the policy cycle, involvement of private sector entities (regardless of their alignment with public health nutrition goals) has particular potential to give rise to COI

because, as highlighted in the previous paragraph, private sector entities hold a role in the commercial sector which may unduly influence policy development-related activities. Food and beverage industries have been shown to attempt to influence policy-making, using approaches similar to those used by the tobacco industry (Mialon et al.2015,2016,2016b). Since awareness is the first preventive measure to be taken, governments may want to consider information and evidence related to such tactics (WHO, 2016a). WHO recommends that national governments have the primary authority to develop policies that create equitable, safe, healthy and sustainable food environments to prevent and control undernutrition, obesity and NCDs (WHO, 2013).

➤ **Appendix 4: Examples of corporate strategies, tactics and mechanisms from the food and beverage industries**

This is also in keeping with the policies adopted by WHO to protect its normative work and its role as a standard setting agency. For instance, private sector stakeholders can be consulted in meetings, but they are excluded from actual decision-making because of the potential COI (WHO, 2012; WHO, 2016b). Furthermore, financial and in-kind contributions from private sector entities to WHO's programmes are only acceptable if, amongst other conditions, they are not used for normative work (WHO, 2016b).

As for monitoring and evaluation, overarching principle of engagement number six recognizes that the process is to be independent and evidence-based. Therefore, engagement of the private sector or not-for-profit sector not at arm's length from the latter should be treated with great caution, as the commercial interests in the outcome of the evaluation may have the potential to compromise the independence of the process (Adams et al.,2010).

❖ **Government leadership in all settings, including multi-stakeholder initiatives**

Governments should ensure that engagement with external actors is government-led, regardless of the form of engagement chosen. Within the parameters set by the government, collaboration and joint decision-making can take place among the actors involved (State and non-State). In order to preserve their leadership over the rules of engagement and the management of COI issues, governments should also be aware of and adequately address power imbalances when engaging with non-State actors or individuals (Buse et al., 2017). A power imbalance is expressed when one actor is potentially able to influence, formally or informally, decision-making disproportionately in ways that are detrimental to other stakeholders and/or to the objectives of the engagement. This is of special relevance if the government chooses to engage through transformational forms of engagement where the level of managerial complexity is higher.

## ❖ Policy coherence and whole-of-government approaches

Policy coherence and whole-of-government approaches are important in the context of the prevention of COI in nutrition . Other ministries may have different goals from the Ministry of Health (MOH) with regards to a specific nutrition intervention, and non-State actors not aligned with the MOH may in fact be aligned with other government sectors.

The adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) should facilitate the coherence and indeed, one of the targets of SDG 17 is to enhance “Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development” (PCSD), which is critical to the implementation of the SDGs (OECD, 2015b).

To support governments in achieving PCSD, the OECD has also developed a number of screening tools, against which policy-makers can review their institutional arrangements and practices (OECD 2016a; OECD 2016b; OECD 2016c, OECD 2016,d).

- **Appendix 5:** *Examples of coordination and screening practices.*
- **Appendix 6:** *Examples of screening tools developed by OECD to support governments in achieving Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development (PCSD).*

## **6. ETHICAL, LEGAL AND REGULATORY INSTRUMENTS**

### **(a) Legal framework on accountability and transparency**

Transparent and accountable regulations create an environment of legal clarity and stability and are the basis of public trust in governmental institutions (WHO, 2014c). One of the most important legally-binding treaties that encourage States Parties to develop a transparent and accountable legal framework is the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) (UNODC, 2004). Although the convention is not specifically designed for COI, it is still an important reference point because of the relationship between COI and corruption. The two concepts are distinct but interrelated. On the one hand, a COI, if not properly managed, may lead to an act of corruption or to criminal offenses addressed by the Convention, such as abuse of function (Article 19), illicit enrichment (Article 20) or obstruction of justice (Article 25) (OECD, 2008). On the other hand, an act of corruption can create a COI, so that measures designed to prevent corruption are also effective to address COI.

- **Appendix 7:** *Non-exhaustive sample of international instruments related to corruption and COI.*

### **(b) International human rights standards**

Governments’ efforts to address COI should also be aligned with, and guided by, relevant internationally recognised human rights standards. These include, but are not limited to, the

right to food and the right to the highest attainable standard of health. Application of human rights standards in actions aimed at avoidance of COI provide a useful basis for understanding and recognizing the obligations of governments to ensure that engagement with individuals and non-State actors does not lead to neglect or violations of citizens' legal entitlements, as stipulated under international and national laws governments are a State Party to.

The right to food is part of the right to an adequate standard of living, as expressed in Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 11 of the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). It implies access to a minimum package of calories but also to nutritional elements that allow people to develop mentally and physically in a healthy way (CESCR, 1999). In a nutshell, it is a right to adequate food in quantity and quality. The right to food is distinct from the concept of food security, but it is connected to it. Indeed, food security is a precondition for the full enjoyment of the right to food (OHCHR, 2010). (CESCR,1999).

The right to health is enshrined in the WHO constitution, and recognized in a number of international human rights treaties, including under Article 12 of the ICESCR, Article 24 of Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) (1989), and Article 12 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) (1979). It encompasses not only health care, but also the underlying determinants of health, including an adequate supply of safe food (CESCR, 2000). Under the CRC, the right to health of the child implies combating malnutrition and making sure that people have access to basic knowledge about infant nutrition, such as the advantages of breastfeeding, and are supported in the use of it. The respect/protect/fulfil framework also applies to the right to health, so that governments have a duty to refrain from violating the right, but also to oversee the behaviour of third parties, including private sector entities, and to take steps for the progressive realization of the right (CESCR, 2000).

Governments can choose the most appropriate national strategies to fulfil their human rights obligations, taking into account the economic, social and cultural context. Governments may consider to:

**(a) Evaluate non-State actors' human rights records** (CESCR, 1999). This should occur prior to engagement with the non-State actor. Factors that countries may consider include human rights risks and impacts related to the activities of the non-State actor, as well as how such issues are addressed by the entity.

**(b) Evaluate the impact of engagement on public capacity to fulfil human rights obligations.** In a nutrition context, this will focus on the effects of engagement on public health interventions related to the right to health and the right to food. (CESCR,2000)

**(c) Use human rights and nutrition instruments in ways that can reinforce each other.** For example, the Committee on the Rights of the Child has recognized that implementation of the International Code of Marketing of Breast-Milk Substitutes (1981) is one way for States to realize the right to health of children. Conversely, many articles of the CRC support the general aims of the Code (WHO, 2017b).

**(d) Recognize the links between different human rights.** This can be demonstrated by examples from country practice. In Brazil, for example, the right to food is seen as part as the right to education—if the state fails to provide food to children, it is also failing to provide education (WHO, 2016a).

## APPENDICES

### APPENDIX 1: Example of purpose of engagement according to the different phases of the policy cycle and activity performed by the external actors.

Actors	Policy development	Policy implementation	Policy monitoring and evaluation
<b>Health-related civil society and philanthropic organizations</b>	Provide advocacy and social-movement building skills to create an enabling environment for national governments and UN agencies to uphold strong legislation to support this issue. Offer clear guidelines for voluntary engagement and disengagement with transnational industrial actors through alliances and partnerships.	Use media advocacy to raise public awareness about the global costs of an unhealthy diet, to strengthen public support for restrictions on HFSSFBP and establish strong accountability systems that include financial penalties for non-compliant companies and industry sectors that do not protect young people from the marketing of HFSSFBP.	Conduct and publish independent monitoring and evaluations of progress achieved by Member States and transnational industrial actors to restrict the marketing of HFSSFBP.
<b>National governments of Member States</b>	Set clear goals and targets to restrict young people's exposure to branded HFSSFBP.	Enact legislation and regulation in accordance with Resolution WHA63.14 and the 2016 ECHO report and establish performance targets that use a standardized, government-defined, nutrient-profiling model across national borders and continents, accompanied by a timeline for expected outcomes.	Strengthen voluntary industry self-regulatory programmes, support the monitoring of expenditure on – and practices in – the marketing of HFSSFBP and enable regulatory bodies to hold non-compliant companies accountable for young people's exposure to such products – via all media platforms.
<b>Transnational industries</b>	Adopt the UNGC's Responsible Business Practices and commit to clear goals and targets set by national governments to restrict young people's exposure to branded HFSSFBP. Protect children and adolescents by not opposing government actions to implement strong legislation and regulation.	Implement competitive business plans to reduce young people's exposure to branded HFSSFBP, and shift marketing resources and product portfolios from such products towards nutrient-dense products, to help young people meet dietary targets.	Demonstrate transparency and cooperation by sharing relevant information on websites and with independent monitoring bodies to monitor and evaluate progress made to restrict the marketing of HFSSFBP to young people within and across countries and globally.
<b>WHO headquarters and regional offices</b>	Support Member States by integrating the marketing of breast-milk substitutes, infant foods and HFSSFBP into a strong Code of Conduct, with long-term funding to support robust monitoring, reporting and accountability systems.	Provide Member States with technical assistance to adopt a standardized, global nutrient-profiling model and to enact policies and legislation to restrict marketing of HFSSFBP to young people.	Publish regular updates on the progress achieved by Member States to fully implement Resolution WHA63.14 by 2025.

ECHO: Commission on Ending Childhood Obesity; HFSSFBP: high-fat, salty and/or sugary food and beverage products; UN: United Nations; UNGC: United Nations Global Compact; WHA: World Health Assembly; WHO: World Health Organization.

**Source:** Kraak VI, Vandevijvere S, Sacks G, Brinsden H, Hawkes C, Barquera S, Lobstein T, Swinburn B. (2016) Progress achieved in restricting the marketing of high-fat, sugary and salty food and beverage products to children. *Bull World Health Org.*;94:540–548. <http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/94/7/15-158667.pdf>.

## APPENDIX 2: Examples of forms of engagement

- **Example of charitable forms of engagement:** A food, beverage company or philanthropic foundation donates funding or resources such as food or beverage products or water to address domestic or global hunger or emergency relief for a natural disaster.
- **Example of transactional forms of engagement:** A food company engages with the government to sponsor a scientific meeting or conference where the corporate brand is visible.
- **Example of transformational forms of engagement:** The government engages in a multi-stakeholder platform to tackle all forms of malnutrition based on information exchange and dialogues.

## APPENDIX 3: Examples of the application of the “Appropriateness of roles” principle in the prevention COI

### Example 1: At the institutional level

- (a) A logistics company or a sugar sweetened beverage company (SSB) want to partner with the Ministry of Health (MOH) to sponsor events for the promotion of physical activity. Nutrition is indeed central to the SSB Company’s expertise and commercial activity, whilst it is not for the logistics company. If the MOH were to engage with the SSB Company, there would be potential for a negative impact on children’s health as well as on the reputation of the MOH. This risk would be lower if the MOH would decide to engage with the logistics company.

### Example 2: At the individual level

- (a) A health professional is a medical doctor and a pharmacist at the same time. This would lead to COI as the medical doctor can take advantage of the position to prescribe drugs that would be later sold in the pharmacy.
- (b) An expert has a relationship with a pharmaceutical company marketing medication for type 2 diabetes. He/she may not be invited to be part of a guideline group recommending treatment for obesity but could be considered for a meeting on iodine fortification.

**APPENDIX 4: Examples of corporate strategies, tactics and mechanisms from the food and beverage industries (Source: Mialon et al.,2015, 2016,2016 b)**

Strategies	Tactics	Mechanisms
<b>Information and messaging</b>	<b>Lobby policy-makers</b>	Lobby directly and indirectly (through third parties) to influence legislation and regulation so that it is favourable to the industry
	<b>Stress the economic importance of the industry</b>	Stress the number of jobs supported and the money generated for the economy
	<b>Promote de-regulation</b>	Highlight the potential burden associated with regulation (losses of jobs, administrative burden)
		Demonise the 'nanny state'
		Threaten to withdraw investments if new public health policies are introduced
	<b>Frame the debate on diet- and public health-related issues</b>	Shift the blame away from the food industry, e.g. focus on individual responsibility, role of parents, physical inactivity
		Promote the good intentions and stress the good traits of the food industry
		Emphasise the food industry's actions to address public health-related issues
	<b>Shape the evidence base on diet- and public health-related issues</b>	Fund research, including through academics, ghost writers, own research institutions and front groups
		Pay scientists as advisers, consultants or spokespersons
		Cherry pick data that favours the industry
		Disseminate and use non-peer reviewed or unpublished evidence
		Participate in and host scientific events
Provide industry-sponsored education materials		
Suppress or influence the dissemination of research		
Emphasise disagreement among scientists and focus on doubt in science		
<b>Financial incentive</b>	<b>Fund and provide financial incentives to political parties and policy-makers</b>	Provide donations, gifts, entertainment or other financial inducements

<b>Constituency building</b>	<b>Establish relationships with key opinion leaders and health organisations</b>	Promote public-private interactions, including philanthropic, transactional and Transformational relationships
		Support professional organisations through funding and / or advertising in their publications
		Establish informal relationships with key opinion leaders
	<b>Seek involvement in the community</b>	Undertake corporate philanthropy
		Support physical activity initiatives
		Support events (such as for youth or the arts) and community-level initiatives
	<b>Establish relationships with policy-makers</b>	Seek involvement in working groups, technical groups and advisory groups
		Provide technical support and advice to policy-makers
		Use the “revolving door”, i.e. ex-food industry staff work in government organisations and vice versa
	<b>Establish relationships with the media</b>	Establish close relationships with media organisations, journalists and bloggers to facilitate media advocacy
<b>Legal</b>	<b>Use legal action (or the threat thereof) against public policies or opponents</b>	Litigate or threaten to litigate against governments, organisations or individuals
	<b>Influence the development of trade and investment agreements</b>	Influence the development of trade and investment agreements such that clauses favourable to the industry are included (e.g., limited trade restrictions, mechanisms for corporations to sue governments)
<b>Policy substitution</b>	<b>Develop and promote alternatives to policies</b>	Develop and promote voluntary codes, self-regulation and non-regulatory initiatives
<b>Opposition fragmentation and destabilization</b>	<b>Criticise public health advocates</b>	Criticise public health advocates personally and publicly, e.g. through the media, blogs
	<b>Create multiple voices against public health measures</b>	Establish fake grassroots organisations (‘astroturfing’)
		Procure the support of community and business groups to oppose public health measures
	<b>Infiltrate, monitor and distract public health advocates, groups and organisations</b>	Monitor the operations and advocacy strategies of public health advocates, groups and organisations
Support the placement of industry-friendly personnel within health organisations		

## APPENDIX 5: Examples of coordination and screening practices

### a) Policy coherence and whole-of-government-approach

#### Example of COI due to a lack of policy coherence: engagement with non-health-related ministries

A beverage (SSB) company establishes a partnership with the Ministry of Education (MOE) to develop materials for schools. In exchange, the company asks the MOE to have its logo in books and school materials given to children as a form of acknowledgement. As an institution, the MOE has (in principle) no COI with the SSB Company. Nonetheless, in the context of protection and promotion of public health, including prevention of NCDs and childhood overweight and obesity, the MOE may help the beverage company to promote its products in a child-related setting. Moreover, it would promote the company's image through association with the government. This may jeopardize Ministry of Health (MOH) efforts to fight childhood overweight and obesity.

### b) Examples of practices to enhance policy coherence

#### National practices at the central level (OECD, 2016a)

One important approach is to ensure central oversight over formulation, implementation and impact of policy and regulations. OECD countries have established Cabinet Sub-Committees or Cabinet Committees, which may provide an opportunity for the relevant authority charged with coordination to know about activities at the ministerial level. These committees also facilitate internal dialogue and the sharing of information across ministries.

#### Collective cabinet responsibility (ECDPM, 2017)

In this practice, all ministries have to support publicly the decisions of the cabinet. This creates incentives for policy coordination across sectors, as support for a given proposal is needed from ministries working on different areas. Usually, a designated officer or body is in charge of overseeing policy coordination. Alternatively, there may be a regular consultation system across ministries, with intermediate steps such as circulating draft proposals for comments.

## APPENDIX 6: Examples of screening tools developed by OECD to support governments in achieving Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development (PCSD)

### Analytical Framework:

#### Policy inter-linkages

- Have economic, social and environmental policy inter-linkages (synergies and trade-offs) been considered?
- How do the planned policy outputs contribute to achieve SDGs?
- How do the actions to attain one SDG (e.g. food security) support or hinder progress in other SDGs (e.g. water or health)?

### Institutional Framework:

#### Awareness and understanding of sustainable development, SDGs, and PCSD

- Are the concepts of sustainable development, SDGs and PCSD well understood by the public?
- What efforts have been made to develop clear, widely accepted and operational objectives and principles for achieving the SDGs?
- How do the SDGs inform policy-making?
- Has the role of PCSD been considered for implementing SDGs?

**Monitoring Framework:**

Measuring policy interactions

- Have the critical interactions across SDGs and Targets been mapped out? Have potential synergies and trade-offs been identified? Have PCSD priority areas been identified based on these interactions? Can existing indicators at national and subnational level be used to capture policy interlinkages and examine co-relations across sectors ? (OECD, 2016a.)

## **APPENDIX 7: Non-exhaustive sample of international instruments related to corruption and COI**

<b>1. UNODC Guidelines on thematic areas around the UN Convention Against Corruption, including:</b>
(a) National Anti-Corruption Strategies, A practical Guide for Development and Implementation (UNODC, 2015)
(b) Guidebook on Anti-corruption in Public Procurement and the Management of Public Finances (UNODC, 2013)
(c) Reporting on Corruption, a resource tool for governments and journalists (UNODC, 2013b)
<b>2. Other Instruments</b>
- Independent Commission Against Corruption, Managing COI in the Public Sector, a toolkit (ICAC/CMC, 2004)
- Inter-American Convention Against Corruption (OAS, 1996)
- The Economic Community of West African States Protocol on the Fight Against Corruption (ECOWAS, 2001)
- The African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (AU, 2003)
- The International Code of Conduct for Public Officials (UN, 1996)
- The Council of Europe: Model Code of Conduct for Public Officials (Council of Europe, 2000)
- European Union, Guidelines on the Prevention and Management of COI in EU Decentralized Agencies (EU, 2013)
- OECD Recommendations on Guidelines for Managing COI in the Public Service (OECD, 2003)

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