\r\n20 March 2006
\r\n\r\nThe Ministry of Health in Egypt has confirmed the country\u2019s first case of human infection with the H5N1 avian influenza virus.
\r\n\r\nThe case occurred in a 30-year-old woman from the Qaliubiya governorate near Cairo. She developed symptoms in early March following close contact with diseased chickens, ducks, and a turkey in the household flock. She was hospitalized on 16 March and died the following day.
\r\n\r\nMonitoring of the woman\u2019s family members and close contacts has found no signs of influenza-like illness.
\r\n\r\nTesting was conducted by the US Naval Medical Research Unit (NAMRU-3), which is based in Cairo. Samples are being sent abroad for diagnostic verification and further analysis by a WHO collaborating laboratory. WHO will adjust the figures in its cumulative number of cases following the results of this external verification.
\r\n\r\nEgypt confirmed its first H5N1 outbreak in poultry on 17 February. The virus has since been reported in 18 of the country\u2019s 26 governorates. In Egypt, poultry are often kept in close proximity to households, also in urban areas.
\r\n","DonId":"","FormattedDate":"20 March 2006"},{"Id":"cd21efbc-c212-4ba9-8846-5082d47168ff","LastModified":"2021-07-04T07:33:29Z","PublicationDate":"2009-02-09T00:00:00Z","DateCreated":"2021-07-04T07:33:29Z","IncludeInSitemap":true,"SystemSourceKey":null,"UrlName":"2009_02_09-en","ItemDefaultUrl":"/2009_02_09-en","Response":"","FurtherInformation":"","Summary":"","PublicationDateAndTime":"2009-02-09T00:00:00Z","TitleSuffix":"","UseOverrideTitle":false,"Title":"Avian influenza - situation in Egypt - update 4","Epidemiology":null,"OverrideTitle":"","Advice":"","Assessment":"","Overview":"\r\n9 February 2009 -\r\nThe Ministry of Health and Population of Egypt has announced a new human case of avian influenza A(H5N1) virus infection. The case is a one and a half year old male from the Maghagha District of Menia Governorate. His symptoms began on 6 February and he was hospitalized at the Maghagha Fever Hospital on 7 February where he remains in a stable condition. Infection with the H5N1 avian influenza virus was confirmed by the Egyptian Central Public Health Laboratory.
\r\n\r\nInvestigations into the source of his infection indicate a history of close contact with dead poultry prior to becoming ill.
\r\n\r\nOf the 55 cases confirmed to date in Egypt, 23 have been fatal.
\r\n","DonId":"","FormattedDate":"9 February 2009"},{"Id":"d194b960-7b19-45a7-b607-9c3ba7315ed1","LastModified":"2022-07-28T22:44:32Z","PublicationDate":"2022-07-28T09:16:58Z","DateCreated":"2022-07-28T22:44:32Z","IncludeInSitemap":true,"SystemSourceKey":null,"UrlName":"2019-DON163","ItemDefaultUrl":"/2019-DON163","Response":"The response to the event has been led by the provincial Department of Health (DOH) and the Sindh AIDS Control Program (SACP). The response has been supported by UN partners, the Pakistan Field Epidemiology & Laboratory Training Program (FELTP), Aga Khan University, and other partners.
A new HIV/AIDS ART Treatment Center for children has been established at Shaikh Zaid Children Hospital. Unauthorized laboratories, blood banks, and clinics have been closed.
A mission led by the Federal Ministry of Health (MOH) and WHO, supported by other UN partners and academia has been conducted through the first half of June. The objectives were to identify sources and chains of transmission of HIV, map the high-risk areas, and identify gaps in HIV diagnosis, care and treatment.
","FurtherInformation":"
1Report on the global HIV/AIDS epidemic-June 1998
2UNAIDS Pakistan country profile
3WHO Consolidated guidelines on HIV testing services, July 2015
","Summary":"","PublicationDateAndTime":"2019-07-03T21:00:00Z","TitleSuffix":"","UseOverrideTitle":false,"Title":"HIV cases\u2013Pakistan","Epidemiology":null,"OverrideTitle":"","Advice":"
This event highlights the importance of using high-impact interventions to reduce vulnerability and prevent transmission mainly in health care settings. It also takes into consideration the prevention of sexual transmission in high risk groups, transmission through injecting drug use and mother-to-child transmission.
WHO recommends that after 18 months of age, three different assays may be required to establish the diagnosis of HIV infection . However, infants less than 18 months of age who are born to HIV infected mother should be diagnosed through nucleic acid testing (NAT)3.
WHO stresses the importance of immediately linking all those diagnosed with HIV infection to antiretroviral treatment (ART), where the test should be repeated to rule out errors in diagnosis (in case second test is negative4) and, thereafter, ART should be started without any delay.
","Assessment":"
Pakistan is one of the countries in the WHO Eastern Mediterranean Region where new HIV infections are increasing at an alarming level since 19871. The current HIV epidemic in Pakistan is defined as a concentrated epidemic. Although the overall prevalence is still less than 1% in the adult population, the latest estimate (2017) of people living with HIV (PLHIV) was 150,0002 . In 2018, 21,000 new PLHIV cases were recorded.
Regarding this event, the overall risk of disease spread within Larkana district is high due to:
Further epidemiological investigations will help determine the magnitude of the event, and whether this event is acute and isolated in nature, or a longer duration situation with these cases (accidentally diagnosed) representing the tip of the iceberg of a larger epidemic.
The risk at regional and global levels is considered very low because the mode of transmission of HIV is very specific and limited to mother to child transmission, contact with contaminated blood through contaminated syringes/other surgical instruments, blood transfusion or sexual contact with PLHIV. The situation is being closely monitored, and the risk will be re-assessed according to the results of the preliminary investigation.
","Overview":"
On 25 April 2019, the local administration in Larkana district was alerted by media reports of a surge in human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) cases among children in Ratodero Taluka, Larkana district, Sindh province, Pakistan. A screening camp was initially established at Taluka’s main hospital. Later, screening was expanded to other health facilities including selected Rural Health Centers (RHCs) and Basic Health Units (BHUs). HIV rapid test kits that were initially used were replaced with pre-qualified WHO test kits.
From 25 April through 28 June 2019, a total of 30,192 people have been screened for HIV, of which 876 were found positive. Eighty-two per cent (719/876) of these were below the age of 15 years. During the screening, several risk factors were identified, including: unsafe intravenous injections during medical procedures; unsafe child delivery practices; unsafe practices at blood banks; poorly implemented infection control programs; and improper collection, storage, segregation and disposal of hospital waste.
This is the fourth reported outbreak of HIV in Larkana district since 2003. The first outbreak in 2003, was among people who inject drugs (PWID), the second was among 12 pediatric patients in a pediatric hospital in 2016, and the third, also in 2016, was among 206 patients in a dialysis unit.
Prior to this event, Larkana district had only one antiretroviral therapy (ART) clinic, which was for adults exclusively (2,568 registered cases by May 2019).
","DonId":"2019-DON163","FormattedDate":"3 July 2019"},{"Id":"9f87b09e-9355-4cac-9e18-615fad230fb3","LastModified":"2021-07-04T07:37:04Z","PublicationDate":"2013-06-23T00:00:00Z","DateCreated":"2021-07-04T07:37:04Z","IncludeInSitemap":true,"SystemSourceKey":null,"UrlName":"2013_06_23-en","ItemDefaultUrl":"/2013_06_23-en","Response":"","FurtherInformation":"","Summary":"The Ministry of Health (MoH) in Saudi Arabia has announced two additional laboratory-confirmed cases and a death in a previously confirmed case of Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV).","PublicationDateAndTime":"2013-06-23T00:00:00Z","TitleSuffix":"","UseOverrideTitle":false,"Title":"Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) - update","Epidemiology":null,"OverrideTitle":"","Advice":"","Assessment":"","Overview":"
\r\n23 June 2013 -\r\nThe Ministry of Health (MoH) in Saudi Arabia has announced two additional laboratory-confirmed cases and a death in a previously confirmed case of Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV).\r\n
\r\n\r\nOne case is a 41 year-old female from Riyadh who had contact with a confirmed case. The other case is a 32 year-old male from the Eastern Region with underlying medical conditions who is in critical condition.\r\n
\r\n\r\nIn addition, the MoH has announced the death of a previously reported confirmed case from the Eastern Region who had been admitted to hospital on 26 April 2013.\r\n
\r\n\r\nGlobally, from September 2012 to date, WHO has been informed of a total of 70 laboratory-confirmed cases of infection with MERS-CoV, including 39 deaths.\r\n
\r\n\r\nWHO has received reports of laboratory-confirmed cases originating in the following countries in the Middle East to date: Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). France, Germany, Italy, Tunisia and the United Kingdom also reported laboratory-confirmed cases; they were either transferred there for care of the disease or returned from the Middle East and subsequently became ill. In France, Italy, Tunisia and the United Kingdom, there has been limited local transmission among patients who had not been to the Middle East but had been in close contact with the laboratory-confirmed or probable cases.\r\n
\r\n\r\nBased on the current situation and available information, WHO encourages all Member States to continue their surveillance for severe acute respiratory infections (SARI) and to carefully review any unusual patterns.
\r\n\r\nHealth care providers are advised to maintain vigilance. Recent travellers returning from the Middle East who develop SARI should be tested for MERS-CoV as advised in the current surveillance recommendations. Specimens from patients\u2019 lower respiratory tracts should be obtained for diagnosis where possible. Clinicians are reminded that MERS-CoV infection should be considered even with atypical signs and symptoms, such as diarrhoea, in patients who are immunocompromised.
\r\n\r\nHealth care facilities are reminded of the importance of systematic implementation of infection prevention and control (IPC). Health care facilities that provide care for patients suspected or confirmed with MERS-CoV infection should take appropriate measures to decrease the risk of transmission of the virus to other patients, health care workers and visitors.
\r\n\r\nAll Member States are reminded to promptly assess and notify WHO of any new case of infection with MERS-CoV, along with information about potential exposures that may have resulted in infection and a description of the clinical course. Investigation into the source of exposure should promptly be initiated to identify the mode of exposure, so that further transmission of the virus can be prevented.
\r\n\r\nWHO does not advise special screening at points of entry with regard to this event nor does it currently recommend the application of any travel or trade restrictions.
\r\n\r\nWHO continues to closely monitor the situation.
\r\n","DonId":"","FormattedDate":"23 June 2013"},{"Id":"4359d577-064d-44c6-bac1-586f0db50381","LastModified":"2024-05-21T08:52:21Z","PublicationDate":"2024-03-07T13:06:11Z","DateCreated":"2024-03-07T13:06:12Z","IncludeInSitemap":true,"SystemSourceKey":null,"UrlName":"2007DON075","ItemDefaultUrl":"/2007DON075","Response":"","FurtherInformation":"","Summary":"","PublicationDateAndTime":"2007-05-30T10:00:00Z","TitleSuffix":"","UseOverrideTitle":true,"Title":"Influenza A (H5N1) virus - China","Epidemiology":"","OverrideTitle":"Influenza A (H5N1) virus - China","Advice":"","Assessment":"","Overview":"The Ministry of Health in China has reported a new case of human infection with the H5N1 avian influenza virus. The case was confirmed by the national laboratory on 23 May.
The 19-year old male soldier, serving in Fujian province, developed fever and pneumonia-like symptoms on 9 May and was hospitalized on 14 May.
There is no initial indication to suggest he had contact with sick birds prior to becoming unwell. Close contacts have been placed under medical observation and all remain well.
Of the 25 cases confirmed to date in China, 15 have been fatal.
","DonId":"2007DON075","FormattedDate":"30 May 2007"},{"Id":"b47e5206-624c-4fa7-9fe7-46fbe61af1dd","LastModified":"2021-07-04T07:27:23Z","PublicationDate":"2012-08-10T00:00:00Z","DateCreated":"2021-07-04T07:27:23Z","IncludeInSitemap":true,"SystemSourceKey":null,"UrlName":"2012_08_10b-en","ItemDefaultUrl":"/2012_08_10b-en","Response":"","FurtherInformation":"","Summary":"","PublicationDateAndTime":"2012-08-10T00:00:00Z","TitleSuffix":"","UseOverrideTitle":false,"Title":"Avian influenza \u2013 situation in Indonesia \u2013 update","Epidemiology":null,"OverrideTitle":"","Advice":"","Assessment":"","Overview":"\r\n10 August 2012 -\r\nThe Ministry of Health of Indonesia has notified WHO of a new case of human infection with avian influenza A(H5N1) virus.
\r\n\r\nThe case is a 37 year old male from Yogyakarta province. He developed fever on 24 July 2012, was hospitalized on 27 July and died on 30 July.
\r\n\r\nEpidemiological investigation on the case found that the case had four pet caged birds in his home, which is about 50 metres from a poultry slaughter house and near a farm.
\r\n\r\nInfection with avian influenza A(H5N1) virus was confirmed by the National Institute of Health Research and Development (NIHRD), Ministry of Health and reported to WHO by the National IHR Focal Point.
\r\n\r\nTo date, the total number of human influenza A(H5N1) cases in Indonesia is 191 with 159 fatalities, 8 (all fatal) of which occurred in 2012.
\r\n","DonId":"","FormattedDate":"10 August 2012"},{"Id":"4523c8e4-db8d-423b-a8f6-81ab1c6c9a56","LastModified":"2021-07-04T07:36:23Z","PublicationDate":"2005-12-30T00:00:00Z","DateCreated":"2021-07-04T07:36:23Z","IncludeInSitemap":true,"SystemSourceKey":null,"UrlName":"2005_12_30-en","ItemDefaultUrl":"/2005_12_30-en","Response":"","FurtherInformation":"","Summary":"","PublicationDateAndTime":"2005-12-30T00:00:00Z","TitleSuffix":"","UseOverrideTitle":false,"Title":"Avian influenza \u2013 situation in China \u2013 update 51","Epidemiology":null,"OverrideTitle":"","Advice":"","Assessment":"","Overview":"\r\n30 December 2005
\r\n\r\nThe Ministry of Health of China has confirmed an additional case of human infection on the mainland with the H5N1 avian influenza virus. The case is a 41-year-old woman from the south-eastern province of Fujian. She developed symptoms of fever followed by pneumonia on 6 December, and was admitted to hospital two days later. The patient died on 21 December.
\r\n\r\nOn 13 December, initial laboratory tests on samples from the patient tested negative for H5N1. But further tests on 23 December \u2013 including PCR tests carried out at the Chinese Center for Disease Control in Beijing \u2013 showed positive results. The virus was also isolated from the patient.
\r\n\r\nClose contacts who have been placed under medical observation have not displayed any symptoms, health authorities report.
\r\n\r\nAgricultural authorities so far have not been able to confirm the presence of the H5 virus subtype in poultry in the vicinity of the patient\u2019s residence or place of work. Investigators have not been able to confirm any direct contact between the patient and poultry prior to the onset of illness. The investigation, however, is continuing and answers to these and other questions are still being sought.
\r\n\r\nThis is China\u2019s seventh laboratory-confirmed human case. Of these cases, three have been fatal (including this latest case). To date, China has reported human cases in six provinces and regions: Hunan, Anhui, Guangxi, Liaoning, Jiangxi and Fujian.
\r\n","DonId":"","FormattedDate":"30 December 2005"},{"Id":"62de408e-2142-41d4-b76f-df511f20d1b6","LastModified":"2021-07-04T08:21:40Z","PublicationDate":"2021-06-07T10:53:19Z","DateCreated":"2021-07-04T08:21:40Z","IncludeInSitemap":true,"SystemSourceKey":null,"UrlName":"2001_05_16-en","ItemDefaultUrl":"/2001_05_16-en","Response":"","FurtherInformation":"","Summary":"","PublicationDateAndTime":"2001-05-16T00:00:00Z","TitleSuffix":"","UseOverrideTitle":false,"Title":"2001 - Meningococcal disease, serogroup W135 - Update","Epidemiology":null,"OverrideTitle":"","Advice":"","Assessment":"","Overview":"\r\n16 May 2001
Disease Outbreak Reported
\r\nDuring 2001 the following countries have reported\r\ncases of W135 meningococcal disease to WHO; most cases are associated with international\r\ntravel or contact with travellers to Saudi Arabia:
\r\n\r\nBurkina Faso: 4 cases have been reported. N.\r\nmeningitidis serogroup W135 has been laboratory confirmed. Travel/contact history of\r\ncases is not yet known.
\r\n\r\nCentral African Republic: 3 cases (Haj\r\npilgrims) have been reported. N. meningitidis serogroup W135 has been laboratory\r\nconfirmed.
\r\n\r\nDenmark: 2 cases (one case close contact\r\nwith Haj pilgrims, the travel/contact history of the second case is not yet known)have\r\nbeen reported. N. meningitidis serogroup W135 has been laboratory confirmed.
\r\n\r\nFrance: 2 cases (close contacts with Haj pilgrims)\r\nhave been reported. N. meningitidis serogroup W135 has been laboratory confirmed.
\r\n\r\nNorway: 4 cases (2 contacts with Haj pilgrims) have\r\nbeen reported. N. meningitidis serogroup W135 has been laboratory confirmed.
\r\n\r\nSaudi Arabia: 109 cases (predominantly Haj pilgrims\r\nfrom outside Saudi Arabia) including 35 deaths have been reported between 9 February and\r\n22 March 2001. N. meningitidis serogroup W135 has been laboratory confirmed in more\r\nthan half of the cases.
\r\n\r\nSingapore: 4 cases (3 close contacts with Haj pilgrims,\r\n1 history of travel to Saudi Arabia), including 1 death have been reported. Two of the\r\ncases occurred in January 2001, before the main period of pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia. N.\r\nmeningitidis serogroup W135 has been laboratory confirmed.
\r\n\r\nUnited Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:\r\n41 cases (8 pilgrims returning from the Haj, 19 cases of close contacts and data\r\noutstanding on the remaining cases) including 11 deaths of laboratory confirmed invasive N.\r\nmeningitidis serogroup W135 have been reported.
\r\n\r\nMeningococcal disease. As with all types of\r\nmeningococcal disease, early diagnosis and treatment are essential. The symptoms of group\r\nW135 meningococcal disease are the same as for other groups of the disease: sudden onset\r\nof intense headache, high fever, nausea, and vomiting, photophobia and stiff neck. The\r\nmost severe clinical form of the disease, meningococcal septicaemia can be presented by\r\nabrupt onset, high fever, petechial rash or purpura.
\r\n\r\nWHO recommends that chemoprophylaxis be given to close\r\ncontacts of the cases, such as persons sleeping in the same dwelling. In most countries\r\nrifampicin is recommended.
\r\n\r\nIn preparation for the Umrah and the Haj seasons for next\r\nyear, the Ministry of Health of the Government of Saudi Arabia has notified the Ministries\r\nof Health of all countries from which pilgrims arrive, that the vaccination against\r\nmeningococcal meningitis with the quadrivalent vaccine (serogroups A,C, Y and W135) has\r\nbeen added to the health requirements for arrivals coming to the Umrah and Haj.
\r\n\r\nWHO encourages national reference laboratories to closely\r\nmonitor meningococcal disease.
\r\n\r\nIn order to fully identify and follow the epidemiological\r\nspread of the W135 strain, WHO encourages countries to send specimens to WHO Collaborating\r\nCentres for Meningococcal Infections. The Centres are:
\r\n\r\nInstitut de M\u00e9decine Tropicale du Service de Sant\u00e9 des\r\nArm\u00e9es
\r\nParc du Pharo, B.P. 46
\r\nF-13998 Marseille-Arm\u00e9es
\r\nFrance
\r\nDr. Pierre Nicolas
\r\nTel: +33 4 91 15 01 15
\r\nFax: +33 4 91 59 44 77
\r\nE-mail:imtssa.meningo@free.fr
\r\nWHO Collaborating Centre for Control of Epidemic Meningitis
\r\nCenters for Disease Control and Prevention
\r\nAtlanta, GA 30333
\r\nUnited States of America
\r\nDr. Tanja Popovic
\r\nTel: +1 404 639 17 30
\r\nFax: +1 404 639 31 23
\r\nE-mail: txp1@cdc.gov
\r\nWHO Collaboration Centre for Reference and Research on\r\nMeningococci
\r\nDepartment of Bacteriology
\r\nNational Institute of Public Health
\r\nPO Box 4404
\r\nTorshov
\r\nN-0403 Oslo
\r\nNorway
\r\nDr. Dominique Caugant
\r\nTel: + 47 22 04 23 11
\r\nFax: + 47 22 04 25 18
\r\nE-mail:dominique.caugant@folkehelsa.no
\r\nFor further information, please contact: outbreak@who.ch
\r\n","DonId":"","FormattedDate":"16 May 2001"},{"Id":"fd702542-99e4-45e2-8db2-45c63ba2d76c","LastModified":"2021-07-04T07:52:12Z","PublicationDate":"2006-03-08T00:00:00Z","DateCreated":"2021-07-04T07:52:12Z","IncludeInSitemap":true,"SystemSourceKey":null,"UrlName":"2006_03_08-en","ItemDefaultUrl":"/2006_03_08-en","Response":"","FurtherInformation":"","Summary":"","PublicationDateAndTime":"2006-03-08T00:00:00Z","TitleSuffix":"","UseOverrideTitle":false,"Title":"Avian influenza \u2013 situation in China \u2013 update 7","Epidemiology":null,"OverrideTitle":"","Advice":"","Assessment":"","Overview":"\r\n8 March 2006
\r\n\r\nThe Ministry of Health in China has reported the country\u2019s 10th death from H5N1 avian influenza. The patient, a 9-year-old girl from the eastern province of Zhejiang, developed symptoms on 10 February and died on 6 March. This case was previously announced by Chinese authorities on 27 February, when the patient was listed as in critical condition.
\r\n\r\nTo date, China has reported 15 laboratory-confirmed cases of human infection with the H5N1 avian influenza virus. Of these, 10 have been fatal.
\r\n","DonId":"","FormattedDate":"8 March 2006"},{"Id":"1d4a76f3-b914-45c7-8c9f-e4e1bc6cba1a","LastModified":"2021-07-04T08:00:57Z","PublicationDate":"2021-06-07T10:02:16Z","DateCreated":"2021-07-04T08:00:57Z","IncludeInSitemap":true,"SystemSourceKey":null,"UrlName":"2003_05_24-en","ItemDefaultUrl":"/2003_05_24-en","Response":"","FurtherInformation":"","Summary":"","PublicationDateAndTime":"2003-05-24T00:00:00Z","TitleSuffix":"","UseOverrideTitle":false,"Title":"Update 65 - Situation in Toronto","Epidemiology":null,"OverrideTitle":"","Advice":"","Assessment":"","Overview":"\r\n24 May 2003
\r\n\r\nSituation in Toronto
Health authorities in Canada have today informed WHO that two clusters of cases of respiratory illness are undergoing investigation for respiratory illness, including pneumonia. One cluster of 5 cases is associated with St John\u2019s Rehabilitation Hospital in Toronto. The second cluster of 26 cases, including 10 health care workers, is associated with North York General Hospital. One patient undergoing investigation has been linked to both hospitals.
\r\nAs a precaution, both clusters are being managed as possibly representing cases of SARS until proven otherwise. Results of laboratory, clinical and epidemiological investigations are expected early next week.
\r\n\r\nThe status of Toronto, which was removed last week from the WHO list of areas with recent local transmission, remains unchanged pending further information made available as the investigations progress.
\r\n\r\nUpdate on cases and countries
As of today, a cumulative total of 8141 probable cases with 696 deaths have been reported from 28 countries. This represents an increase of 89 new cases and 7 deaths when compared with yesterday. The new deaths occurred in China (5) and Hong Kong SAR (2).
\r\nAll of the new cases were reported from two outbreak sites, Taiwan and China. Taiwan has today reported 55 new cases, bringing the cumulative total to 538 cases and 60 deaths. China reported 34 new cases, bringing the cumulative total to 5309 cases and 308 deaths.
\r\n","DonId":"","FormattedDate":"24 May 2003"},{"Id":"24c375d7-bf30-4865-aac1-08d0fb78b769","LastModified":"2021-07-04T08:12:07Z","PublicationDate":"2021-06-07T11:09:38Z","DateCreated":"2021-07-04T08:12:07Z","IncludeInSitemap":true,"SystemSourceKey":null,"UrlName":"2000_04_21b-en","ItemDefaultUrl":"/2000_04_21b-en","Response":"","FurtherInformation":"","Summary":"","PublicationDateAndTime":"2000-04-21T00:00:00Z","TitleSuffix":"","UseOverrideTitle":false,"Title":"2000 - Meningococcal disease in Francen(Update), United Kingdom (Update), Oman, Saudi ARabia, Netherlands","Epidemiology":null,"OverrideTitle":"","Advice":"","Assessment":"","Overview":"\r\n21 April 2000
Disease Outbreak Reported
\r\nThere have been a number of cases of meningococcal disease which are associated with\r\nreturnees from the Haj and their close contacts.
\r\n\r\nFrance- Update. The number of cases of meningococcal disease associated with\r\npilgrims who have travelled for the Haj has increased, and the total number of cases to\r\ndate is 14, including 4 deaths. Eleven of the confirmed cases were of meningococcal\r\nserogroup W135.
\r\n\r\nUnited Kingdom- Update. The number of cases of meningococcal disease linked to\r\npilgrims has increased, and is now 22 with 4 deaths. Twenty of the confirmed cases are of\r\nmeningococcal serogroup W135 and 1 of N. meningitidis serogroup A. The onset of the\r\nlast case of meningococcal disease reported to date (in a contact) was on 11 April.
\r\n\r\nOman. There have been 12 cases to date, all have recovered. Of these, 3 were\r\npilgrims (2 males aged 40 and 55 years and 1 female aged 60 years) returning from the Haj,\r\nand 9 cases were close contacts of those returned from the Haj. The ages of these patients\r\nranged from 6 months to 80 years. The date of onset of the first case was 20 March, and\r\nthe most recent case was reported on 6 April. Seven of the confirmed cases are of\r\nmeningococcal serogroup W135 and 2 of Neisseria meningitidis serogroup A.
\r\n\r\nSaudi Arabia. A total of 199 cases with 55 deaths has been reported since the Haj\r\nlast month. Bacteriological investigations have revealed N. meningitidis serogroup\r\nA in 55 cases, serogroup W135 in 30 and serogroup B in 1 case. A record number of pilgrims\r\n(around 1.3 million) travelled to Saudi Arabia for the Haj this year, with an increase in\r\nthe number from South-East Asia. The health authorities are monitoring the situation\r\nclosely. Case management and contact tracing are taking place.
\r\n\r\nNetherlands. There have been 2 confirmed cases and 1 probable case of meningococcal\r\ndisease in close contacts of pilgrims returning from the Haj. The dates of onset in the\r\nconfirmed cases were 5 and 6 April. Serogroup W135 Neisseiria meningitidis has been\r\nisolated from both.
\r\n\r\nMeningococcal disease. As with all types of meningococcal disease, early diagnosis\r\nand treatment are essential. The symptoms of group W135 meningococcal disease are the same\r\nas for other groups of the disease: sudden onset of intense headache, high fever, nausea,\r\nand vomiting, photophobia and stiff neck. The most severe clinical form of the disease,\r\nmeningococcal septicaemia can be presented by abrupt onset, high fever, petechial rash or\r\npurpura.
\r\n\r\nWHO recommends that chemoprophylaxis be given to close contacts of the cases, such as\r\npersons sleeping in the same dwelling. In most countries rifampicin is recommended.\r\nImmunization against meningococcal disease A+C has been an entry requirement by Saudi\r\nArabia for pilgrims travelling to the Haj. However, the meningococcal A+C vaccine does not\r\nprotect against group W135 infection.
\r\n\r\nWHO encourages national reference laboratories to closely monitor meningococcal\r\ndisease.
\r\n","DonId":"","FormattedDate":"21 April 2000"},{"Id":"ea78e382-c2a5-4a54-aa27-c1d97d43064f","LastModified":"2021-07-04T08:02:51Z","PublicationDate":"2021-06-07T10:01:30Z","DateCreated":"2021-07-04T08:02:51Z","IncludeInSitemap":true,"SystemSourceKey":null,"UrlName":"2003_06_17A-en","ItemDefaultUrl":"/2003_06_17A-en","Response":"","FurtherInformation":"","Summary":"","PublicationDateAndTime":"2003-06-19T00:00:00Z","TitleSuffix":"","UseOverrideTitle":false,"Title":"Cholera in Iraq - Update 3","Epidemiology":null,"OverrideTitle":"","Advice":"","Assessment":"","Overview":"\r\n19 June 2003
Disease Outbreak Reported
\r\nFrom 28 April to 4 June 2003, a total of 73 laboratory-confirmed cholera cases have been reported in Iraq : 68 in Basra governorate, 4 in Missan governorate, 1 in Muthana governorate. No deaths have been reported.
\r\nFrom 17 May to 4 June 2003, the daily surveillance system of diarrhoeal disease cases in the four main hospitals of Basra reported a total of 1549 cases of acute watery diarrhea. Among these cases, 25.6 % occurred in patients aged 5 years and above.
\r\nThe water supply situation is critical. Short-term measures have been undertaken by UNICEF and local authorities to improve accessibility to safe drinking water and to limit the spread of water-borne epidemics.
\r\nWHO is supporting local authorities in implementing an early warning communicable disease surveillance system, in strengthening laboratory capacity and in coordinating the cholera outbreak response.
\r\n\r\nThe surveillance system is being expanded to the whole Lower South (all 4 governorates) and weekly reports from all facilities have begun.
\r\n\r\nUNICEF is also supporting the initiative by providing health education material in Arabic and chlorine tablets to all health directorates.
\r\n","DonId":"","FormattedDate":"19 June 2003"},{"Id":"7a45890a-67e1-4969-a6a2-abdc7119ad2b","LastModified":"2021-07-04T07:55:56Z","PublicationDate":"2010-11-04T00:00:00Z","DateCreated":"2021-07-04T07:55:56Z","IncludeInSitemap":true,"SystemSourceKey":null,"UrlName":"2010_11_04a-en","ItemDefaultUrl":"/2010_11_04a-en","Response":"","FurtherInformation":"","Summary":"","PublicationDateAndTime":"2010-11-04T00:00:00Z","TitleSuffix":"","UseOverrideTitle":false,"Title":"Polio in Congo","Epidemiology":null,"OverrideTitle":"","Advice":"","Assessment":"","Overview":"\r\n4 November 2010 -\r\nAn acute outbreak of poliomyelitis is occurring in the Republic of Congo, with 120 cases of acute flaccid paralysis and 58 deaths. Half the cases have been reported in the past ten days, with the first case occurring in early October. Two cases have been confirmed to have been caused by wild poliovirus type 1 and laboratory testing continues.
\r\n\r\nMost cases are in young adults: among those cases for which age data is available (43) at this time, 33 are between the ages of 15-25 years. Only one is under five years old, three are between 7 and 13 and five are between 26 and 58.
\r\n\r\nThe outbreak is due to imported poliovirus. Congo had recorded its last case of indigenous polio in 2000. Investigations are ongoing to determine definitively the origins of the virus.
\r\n\r\nNearly all cases have been reported from the port city of Pointe Noire, with cases also reported from Dolisie (2), Kayes, Bouenza, Brazzaville, and Mvouiti (one each).
\r\n\r\nThe Government of Congo has alerted the public to the outbreak and launched an emergency response plan, with support from key partners, including WHO, UNICEF and the US CDC. At least three nationwide vaccination campaigns are expected, using monovalent oral polio vaccine and targeting the entire population. The number, geographic extent and target age groups of further campaigns will be determined by the Government based on the evolving epidemiology. It is anticipated that a multi-country campaign will be required to cover bordering at-risk areas. New cases continue to be reported every day.
\r\n\r\nIt is important that countries across central Africa and the Horn of Africa strengthen AFP surveillance, in order to rapidly detect any poliovirus importations and facilitate a rapid response. Countries should also strengthen population immunity levels to minimise the consequences of any virus introduction. As per recommendations outlined in WHO's International Travel and Health, guidance travellers to and from Angola and DR Congo should be fully protected by vaccination.
\r\n\r\nGiven the recent progress achieved in Nigeria (98% reduction in cases this year compared to the same period in 2009), very high priority is being given to rapidly controlling persistent transmission such as in Angola and stopping new outbreaks such as Congo.
\r\nThe government of the Republic of Korea continues to implement intense case and contact management activities. As of 21 July, 5 contacts are being monitored.
Based on the current situation and available information, WHO encourages all Member States to continue their surveillance for acute respiratory infections and to carefully review any unusual patterns.
Infection prevention and control measures are critical to prevent the possible spread of MERS-CoV in health care facilities. It is not always possible to identify patients with MERS-CoV early because, like other respiratory infections, the early symptoms of MERS-CoV are non-specific. Therefore, health-care workers should always apply standard precautions consistently with all patients, regardless of their diagnosis. Droplet precautions should be added to the standard precautions when providing care to patients with symptoms of acute respiratory infection; contact precautions and eye protection should be added when caring for probable or confirmed cases of MERS-CoV infection; airborne precautions should be applied when performing aerosol generating procedures.
Until more is understood about MERS-CoV, people with diabetes, renal failure, chronic lung disease, and immunocompromised persons are considered to be at high risk of severe disease from MERS\u2010CoV infection. General hygiene measures, such as regular hand washing, should be adhered to.
WHO remains vigilant and is monitoring the situation. Given the lack of evidence of sustained human-to-human transmission in the community, WHO does not recommend travel or trade restrictions with regard to this event. Raising awareness about MERS-CoV among travellers to and from affected countries is good public health practice.
Public health authorities in host countries preparing for mass gatherings should ensure that all recommendations and guidance issued by WHO with respect to MERS-CoV have been appropriately taken into consideration and made accessible to all concerned officials. Public health authorities should plan for surge capacity to ensure that visitors during the mass gathering can be accommodated by health systems.
Due to the steep decline in case reporting, Disease Outbreak News concerning MERS-CoV in the Republic of Korea will no longer be published on a bi-weekly basis (on Tuesdays and Fridays). Future DONs will report additional cases should they arise.
To date, a total of 186 MERS-CoV cases, including 36 deaths, have been reported. One of the 186 cases is the case that was confirmed in China and also notified by the National IHR Focal Point of China.
The median age of the cases is 55 years old (ranging from 16 to 87 years old). The majority of cases are men (59%). Twenty-six cases (14%) are health care professionals. To date, all cases have been linked to a single chain of transmission and are associated with health care facilities.
Detailed information concerning MERS-CoV cases in the Republic of Korea can be found in a separate document (see related links).
Globally, since September 2012, WHO has been notified of 1,368 laboratory-confirmed cases of infection with MERS-CoV, including at least 490 related deaths.
\r\n20 February 2001
Disease Outbreak Reported
\r\nThe highest number of cases and the highest burden of this\r\ndisease occur in sub-Saharan Africa in an area that is referred to as the meningitis belt.\r\n This is the area between Senegal and Ethiopia and includes all or part of at least\r\n15 countries, with an estimated total population of approximately 300 million. Epidemics occur in seasonal\r\ncycles between the end of November and the end of June, depending on the location and\r\nclimate of the country and declines rapidly with the arrival of the rainy season.
\r\n\r\nWHO has reported a total number of 603 cases, including 45\r\ndeaths (case-fatality rate of 7.5%) in 4 d\u00e9partements in the north of Benin:\r\nAlibori, Borgou, Atacora and Donga, since January 2001. Neisseria meningitidis\r\nserogroup A has been confirmed. The Ministry of Health has initiated a mass vaccination\r\ncampaign in these d\u00e9partements.
\r\n\r\nFrom 25 December 2000 to 15 February 2001, a total of 798\r\ncases and 83 deaths (case-fatality rate of 10.4%) has been reported by WHO in 2\r\npr\u00e9fectures in southwestern Chad: Moyen-Chari and Longone Occidental. Neisseria\r\nmeningitidis serogroup A has been confirmed. A mass vaccination campaign is underway.
\r\n\r\nAs of 30 January 2001, WHO has reported an outbreak of\r\nmeningocccal disease in Ethiopia in 5 regions: Amhara, Gambella, Somali,\r\nTigray and Southern regions, with a total of 485 cases and 61 deaths. Neisseria\r\nmeningitidis serogroup A has been confirmed. The Ministry of Health has reinforced\r\nsurveillance and is carrying out vaccinations in the affected areas. The media is\r\nalso providing health education messages.
\r\n","DonId":"","FormattedDate":"20 February 2001"},{"Id":"e142394c-d83b-4d55-a263-a2948615d454","LastModified":"2024-02-26T16:21:13Z","PublicationDate":"2019-01-08T00:00:00Z","DateCreated":"2021-04-30T11:26:12Z","IncludeInSitemap":true,"SystemSourceKey":null,"UrlName":"08-january-2019-poliovirus-drc-en","ItemDefaultUrl":"/08-january-2019-poliovirus-drc-en","Response":"In February 2018, the government declared cVDPV2 to be a national public health emergency. On 26 July 2018, the Minister of Health, WHO Director General, the Regional Director for Africa, and provincial governors convened an urgent, high-level meeting and signed the ‘Kinshasa Declaration for Polio Eradication’. Provincial governors pledged to provide the necessary oversight, accountability and resources required to urgently improve the quality of the outbreak response being implemented across the country. It is imperative that the remaining operational gaps in outbreak response are urgently filled with the appropriate oversight and engagement.
WHO and partners are responding in accordance with international outbreak response protocols including through administration of monovalent oral polio vaccine type 2 (mOPV2). However, operational gaps such as the under-immunization of high-risk populations, continue to hamper the full implementation of these protocols. Thus, the response so far has not adequately controlled the outbreak nor prevented its spread. The recent emergence of the fourth outbreak of cVDPV2 from Haut Katanga can potentially be attributed to the prior use of mOPV2 and may be related to the response program’s current limited capacity to adapt effectively and implement necessary corrective measures in a timely manner.
With the evidence of geographic spread of some of these strains and emergence of the new strain, two large scale rounds of mOPV2 were administered in September 2018 and October 2018 targeting around 12 million children in 16 of 26 provinces of the country. Surveillance and immunization activities continue to be strengthened in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and neighboring countries.
The polio outbreak response is being conducted simultaneously to the ongoing Ebola outbreak affecting North Kivu province to the east of the country. Polio outbreak response teams are coordinating closely with the broader humanitarian emergency network, to ensure both outbreaks are addressed in a coordinated manner.
","Summary":"","PublicationDateAndTime":"2019-01-08T00:00:00Z","TitleSuffix":"","UseOverrideTitle":true,"Title":"Circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus type 2 - Democratic Republic of the Congo","Epidemiology":"","OverrideTitle":"Circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus type 2 - Democratic Republic of the Congo","Advice":"
It is important that all countries, in particular those with frequent travel and contacts with polio-affected countries and areas, strengthen surveillance for AFP cases in order to rapidly detect any new virus importation and to facilitate a rapid response. Countries, territories and areas should also maintain uniformly high routine immunization coverage at the district level to minimize the consequences of any new virus introduction.
WHO’s International Travel and Health recommends that all travelers to polio-affected areas be fully vaccinated against polio. Residents and visitors staying for more than four- weeks in affected areas should receive an additional dose of oral polio vaccine (OPV) or inactivated polio vaccine (IPV) within four weeks to 12 months of travel. Efforts should also be made to ensure that individuals who received vaccinations are provided the appropriate documentation to record their vaccination status.
As per the advice of the Emergency Committee convened under the International Health Regulations (2005), efforts to limit the international spread of poliovirus must continue as it remains a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC). Countries affected by poliovirus transmission are subject to Temporary Recommendations. To comply with the Temporary Recommendations issued under the PHEIC, any country affected by poliovirus transmission should declare the outbreak as a national public health emergency.
At this time, WHO does not recommend any restrictions on travel and/or trade to the Democratic Republic of the Congo on the basis of the information available for the current cVDPV2 outbreaks.
Cross border activities should be conducted between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and neighboring countries to strengthen AFP surveillance and routine immunization as well as operations linked to the control of other vaccine preventable diseases. Direct and regular collaboration between neighboring provinces and districts should begin quickly awaiting formal administrative and political address.
Currently, WHO finds the overall national public health risk associated with these four outbreaks to be very high. The risk of international spread, particularly to the neighboring countries also remains high due to the continuation of these outbreaks close to international borders. This risk is magnified by known population movements between the affected areas of Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, Central African Republic, Zambia and South Sudan.
As of July 2018, in light of the epidemiology of the reported polio cases, genetic analyses of the isolated polioviruses, risk of further in-country and international spread, and the country’s response capacity, the outbreak has been graded as a Grade 2 public health emergency based on the WHO Emergency Response Framework.
The detection of cVDPV2s underscores the importance of maintaining high routine vaccination coverage to minimize the risk and consequences of poliovirus circulation. These events also highlight the risks posed by any low-level transmission of the virus. A robust outbreak response is necessary to impede further disease transmission, ensure sufficient vaccination coverage in the affected areas, and prevent similar outbreaks in the future. WHO will continue to monitor and evaluate the epidemiological situation and outbreak response measures being implemented.
\r\n15 February 2007
\r\n\r\nThe Egyptian Ministry of Health and Population has announced a new human case of avian influenza A(H5N1) virus infection. The case was confirmed by the Egyptian Central Public Health Laboratory and by the US Naval Medical Research Unit No.3 (NAMRU-3).
\r\n\r\nThe 37-year-old female from Fayyoum Governorate was admitted to hospital with symptoms on 12 February 2007 and her condition remains stable. She was involved in the slaughter and defeathering of sick birds one week prior to the onset of illness.
\r\n\r\nOf the 21 cases confirmed to date in Egypt, 12 have been fatal.
\r\n","DonId":"","FormattedDate":"15 February 2007"},{"Id":"773bf2b8-1e60-4d96-9ddc-e42616ae5161","LastModified":"2024-05-21T07:49:00Z","PublicationDate":"2024-03-12T22:25:16Z","DateCreated":"2024-05-21T07:49:00Z","IncludeInSitemap":true,"SystemSourceKey":null,"UrlName":"2005DON106","ItemDefaultUrl":"/2005DON106","Response":"","FurtherInformation":"","Summary":"","PublicationDateAndTime":"2005-01-19T11:00:00Z","TitleSuffix":"","UseOverrideTitle":true,"Title":"Typhoid fever - Democratic Republic of the Congo","Epidemiology":"","OverrideTitle":"Typhoid fever - Democratic Republic of the Congo","Advice":"","Assessment":"","Overview":"From 27 September 2004 - 11 January 2005, WHO has received reports of a total of 42 564 cases and 214 deaths (case fatality ratio, 0.5%), and 696 severe cases of intestinal perforation in Kinshasa. (see previous report).
Médecins sans Frontières-Belgium has been working to provide clean water. With this provision and other control measures including health education activities, the number of cases appears to be declining.
","DonId":"2005DON106","FormattedDate":"19 January 2005"},{"Id":"01ce66b8-d656-4829-b49b-03e6fbd486cb","LastModified":"2021-07-04T07:23:00Z","PublicationDate":"2013-11-26T00:00:00Z","DateCreated":"2021-07-04T07:23:00Z","IncludeInSitemap":true,"SystemSourceKey":null,"UrlName":"2013_11_26polio-en","ItemDefaultUrl":"/2013_11_26polio-en","Response":"","FurtherInformation":"","Summary":"A total of 17 cases due to wild poliovirus type 1 (WPV1) have been confirmed in the Syrian Arab Republic. In addition to 15 cases confirmed in Deir Al Zour province, two additional cases have been confirmed, one each in rural Damascus and Aleppo, confirming widespread circulation of the virus. The case with most recent onset developed paralysis on 8 October 2013. ","PublicationDateAndTime":"2013-11-26T00:00:00Z","TitleSuffix":"","UseOverrideTitle":false,"Title":"Polio in the Syrian Arab Republic - update","Epidemiology":null,"OverrideTitle":"","Advice":"","Assessment":"","Overview":"Disease outbreak news \r\n
\r\n\r\n26 November 2013 -\r\nA total of 17 cases due to wild poliovirus type 1 (WPV1) have been confirmed in the Syrian Arab Republic. In addition to 15 cases confirmed in Deir Al Zour province, two additional cases have been confirmed, one each in rural Damascus and Aleppo, confirming widespread circulation of the virus. The case with most recent onset developed paralysis on 8 October 2013.
\r\n\r\nA comprehensive outbreak response continues to be implemented across the region. Seven countries and territories are holding mass polio vaccination campaigns targeting 22 million children under the age of five years. In a joint resolution, all countries of the WHO Eastern Mediterranean Region have declared polio eradication to be an emergency, calling for support in negotiating and establishing access to those children who are currently unreached with polio vaccination. WHO and UNICEF are committed to work with all organizations and agencies providing humanitarian assistance to Syrians affected by the conflict to ensure all Syrian children are vaccinated no matter where they live.
\r\n\r\nIt is anticipated that outbreak response will need to continue for at least six to eight months, depending on the area and based on evolving epidemiology.
\r\n\r\nGiven the current situation in the Syrian Arab Republic, frequent population movements across the region and subnational immunity gaps in key areas, the risk of further spread of wild poliovirus across the region is considered to be high. A surveillance alert has been issued for the region to actively search for additional potential cases in addition to implementing the recommended supplementary immunization activities with oral polio vaccine.
\r\n\r\n6 May 2010 -\r\nThe Ministry of Health of Indonesia has announced two new confirmed cases of human infection with the H5N1 avian influenza virus. A 45-year-old female from the city of Malang in East Java province developed symptoms on 22 February. She recovered and is in a healthy condition. The case disposed of dead chickens in the 4 days before onset of symptoms.
\r\n\r\nThe second case, a 4-year-old female from the city of Pekanbaru in Riau province developed symptoms on 19 April, was hospitalized on 22 April but died on 28 April. Investigations into the source of infection are ongoing.\r\n
\r\n\r\nLaboratory tests on both cases confirmed infection with the H5N1 avian influenza virus.
\r\n\r\nOf the 165 cases confirmed to date in Indonesia, 136 have been fatal.\r\n
\r\n","DonId":"","FormattedDate":"6 May 2010"},{"Id":"1a485ea2-2254-428e-b8c0-2e8076fcf258","LastModified":"2021-07-04T07:21:43Z","PublicationDate":"2012-10-04T00:00:00Z","DateCreated":"2021-07-04T07:21:43Z","IncludeInSitemap":true,"SystemSourceKey":null,"UrlName":"2012_10_04-en","ItemDefaultUrl":"/2012_10_04-en","Response":"","FurtherInformation":"","Summary":"","PublicationDateAndTime":"2012-10-04T00:00:00Z","TitleSuffix":"","UseOverrideTitle":false,"Title":"End of Ebola outbreak in Uganda","Epidemiology":null,"OverrideTitle":"","Advice":"","Assessment":"","Overview":"\r\n4 October 2012 -\r\nThe Ministry of Health (MoH), Uganda has declared today, the end of the Ebola haemorrhagic fever (EHF) outbreak in Kibaale district. The last case was confirmed on 3 August 2012 and was discharged from the hospital on 24 August 2012. This is double the maximum incubation period (21 days) for Ebola as recommended by WHO. In the outbreak, a total of 24 probable and confirmed cases were recorded, of which 11 were laboratory confirmed by the Uganda Virus Research Institute (UVRI) in Entebbe. A total of 17 deaths were reported in this outbreak.
\r\n\r\nNational and District Ebola Task Forces were coordinated by the MoH to respond to the outbreak. MoH worked closely with WHO and other agencies which included the African Field Epidemiology Network (AFENET), EMESCO Foundation (a local NGO), Infectious Diseases Institute (IDI), Uganda Red Cross Society (URCS), M\u00e9decins Sans Fronti\u00e8res (MSF), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), US Centers for Disease Control and prevention (CDC), US Agency for International Development (USAID). WHO also coordinated with the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN) to support the response operations.
\r\n\r\nThe response activities carried out during the outbreak included enhanced surveillance for early case detection and contact tracing, reinforcement of infection prevention and control including case management in isolation facilities using barrier nursing and conducting supervised safe burials, reinforcement of standard precautions in health care settings and enhancing communication interventions at the national and community levels.
\r\n\r\nA team led by CDC conducted ecological studies in Kibaale district to try and understand the likely source and route of transmission of the virus. Samples from bats, primates and livestock were collected to study the possible source of the Ebola virus and putative initial human infection from wildlife.
\r\n\r\nThe Ebola response teams have continued to educate the community on prevention, detection of and early reporting of any suspected cases in future. Health workers in the district have been trained on prevention of health care associated infections.
\r\n\r\nWHO does not recommend that any travel or trade restrictions be applied to the Uganda with respect to this event.
\r\n\r\nThere are five identified subtypes of Ebola virus. The subtypes have been named after the location where they were been first detected in EHF outbreaks. Three subtypes of the five have been associated with large EHF outbreaks in Africa. Ebola-Zaire, Ebola-Sudan and Ebola-Bundibugyo. EHF is a febrile haemorrhagic illness which causes death in 25-90% of all cases. The Ebola Reston species, found in the Philippines, can infect humans, but no illness or death in humans has been reported to date.
\r\n","DonId":"","FormattedDate":"4 October 2012"},{"Id":"e189be40-a3b2-42d4-91d8-2170c67bc261","LastModified":"2023-12-14T13:04:42Z","PublicationDate":"2021-06-03T09:25:54Z","DateCreated":"2021-06-03T09:25:54Z","IncludeInSitemap":true,"SystemSourceKey":null,"UrlName":"19-december-2017-mers-saudi-arabia-en","ItemDefaultUrl":"/19-december-2017-mers-saudi-arabia-en","Response":"The source of infection for each case reported is under investigation by the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Agriculture (when dromedaries are involved) in Saudi Arabia. The Saudi Arabian Ministry of Health has identified and is following up health care workers and household contacts of known MERS patients.
Based on the current situation and available information, WHO encourages all Member States to continue their surveillance for acute respiratory infections and to carefully review any unusual patterns.
Infection prevention and control measures are critical to prevent the possible spread of MERS-CoV in health care facilities. It is not always possible to identify patients with MERS-CoV early because, like other respiratory infections, the early symptoms of MERS-CoV are non-specific. Therefore, health care workers should always apply standard precautions consistently with all patients, regardless of their diagnosis. Droplet precautions should be added to the standard precautions when providing care to patients with symptoms of acute respiratory infection; contact precautions and eye protection should be added when caring for probable or confirmed cases of MERS-CoV infection; airborne precautions should be applied when performing aerosol generating procedures.
Community and household awareness of MERS and MERS prevention measures in the home may reduce household transmission and prevent community clusters.
Until more is understood about MERS-CoV, people with diabetes, renal failure, chronic lung disease, and immunocompromised persons are considered to be at high risk of severe disease from MERS-CoV infection. Therefore, in addition to avoiding close contact with suspected or confirmed human cases of the disease, people with these conditions should avoid close contact with animals, particularly camels, when visiting farms, markets, or barn areas where the virus is known to be or potentially circulating. General hygiene measures, such as regular hand washing before and after touching animals and avoiding contact with sick animals, should be adhered to.
Food hygiene practices should be observed. People should avoid drinking raw camel milk or camel urine, or eating meat that has not been properly cooked.
WHO does not advise special screening at points of entry with regard to this event nor does it currently recommend the application of any travel or trade restrictions.
","Assessment":"Infection with MERS-CoV can cause severe disease resulting in high mortality. Humans are infected with MERS-CoV from direct or indirect contact with dromedary camels. MERS-CoV has demonstrated the ability to transmit between humans. So far, the observed non-sustained human-to-human transmission has occurred mainly in health care settings.
The notification of additional cases does not change the overall risk assessment. WHO expects that additional cases of MERS-CoV infection will be reported from the Middle East, and that cases will continue to be exported to other countries by individuals who might acquire the infection after exposure to animals or animal products (for example, following contact with dromedaries) or human source (for example, in a health care setting). WHO continues to monitor the epidemiological situation and conducts risk assessment based on the latest available information.
","Overview":"Between 31 October and 8 December 2017, the National IHR Focal Point of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia reported 18 additional cases of Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) infection, including five deaths. Additionally, two deaths from a previously reported case were reported to WHO.
Detailed information concerning the cases reported can be found in a separate document (see link below).
The 18 cases of MERS-CoV infection reported during this time period are from three regions of the country. At the time of writing, among the 18 cases reported, five reported contact with dromedaries and one is a close contact of a known case. Investigations into the source of infection for each case, including direct and/or indirect contact with dromedaries, are ongoing.
Globally, 2121 laboratory-confirmed cases of infection with MERS-CoV including at least 740 related deaths have been reported to WHO.
See MERS-CoV maps and epicurvesDisease outbreak news \r\n
\r\n\r\n17 December 2013 -\r\nOn 15 and 16 December 2013, the National Health and Family Planning Commission, China notified WHO of two new laboratory-confirmed cases of human infection with avian influenza A(H7N9) virus.
\r\n\r\nThe first patient is a 39-year-old man from Guangdong Province. He became ill on 6 December 2013 and was admitted to hospital on 11 December 2013. He is currently in critical condition.
\r\n\r\nThe second patient is a 65-year-old woman from Guangdong Province. She was exposed to live poultry and became ill on 11 December 2013 and was admitted to hospital on 15 December 2013. She is currently in critical condition.
\r\n\r\nSo far, there is no evidence of sustained human-to-human transmission.
\r\n\r\nThe Chinese government continues to take the following surveillance and control measures:
\r\n\r\nWHO does not advise special screening at points of entry with regard to this event, nor does it currently recommend any travel or trade restrictions.
\r\n","DonId":"","FormattedDate":"17 December 2013"},{"Id":"4578da21-2c58-4177-a28a-d3c6cc0a1a14","LastModified":"2021-07-04T06:53:05Z","PublicationDate":"2021-06-08T13:32:24Z","DateCreated":"2021-07-04T06:53:05Z","IncludeInSitemap":true,"SystemSourceKey":null,"UrlName":"1997_01_09b-en","ItemDefaultUrl":"/1997_01_09b-en","Response":"","FurtherInformation":"","Summary":"","PublicationDateAndTime":"1997-01-08T00:00:00Z","TitleSuffix":"","UseOverrideTitle":false,"Title":"1997 - Ebola haemorrhagic fever in Gabon (new outbreak) - Update 12","Epidemiology":null,"OverrideTitle":"","Advice":"","Assessment":"","Overview":"\r\n09 January 1997
Disease Outbreak Reported
\r\nThe latest report from Gabon informs that a total of 58 cases with 43 deaths had\r\noccurred in the outbreak up to 8 January. The last fatal case occurred on 8 January. One patient\r\nis still hospitalized and 14 have recovered.
\r\n","DonId":"","FormattedDate":"8 January 1997"},{"Id":"50176e7b-8756-4983-b251-e2db18541ba5","LastModified":"2023-12-21T12:51:02Z","PublicationDate":"2021-06-03T09:08:59Z","DateCreated":"2021-06-03T09:08:59Z","IncludeInSitemap":true,"SystemSourceKey":null,"UrlName":"03-october-2018-mers-saudi-arabia-en","ItemDefaultUrl":"/03-october-2018-mers-saudi-arabia-en","Response":"Infection with MERS-CoV can cause severe disease resulting in high mortality. Humans are infected with MERS-CoV from direct or indirect contact with dromedary camels. MERS-CoV has demonstrated the ability to transmit between humans. So far, the observed non-sustained human-to-human transmission has occurred mainly in health care settings.
The notification of additional cases does not change the overall risk assessment. WHO expects that additional cases of MERS-CoV infection will be reported from the Middle East, and that cases will continue to be exported to other countries by individuals who might acquire the infection after exposure to animals or animal products (for example, following contact with camels) or human source (for example, in a health care setting). WHO continues to monitor the epidemiological situation and conducts risk assessment based on the latest available information.
Based on the current situation and available information, WHO encourages all Member States to continue their surveillance for acute respiratory infections and to carefully review any unusual patterns. Infection prevention and control measures are critical to prevent the possible spread of MERS-CoV in health care facilities. It is not always possible to identify patients with MERS-CoV early because like other respiratory infections, the early symptoms of MERS-CoV are non-specific. Therefore, health care workers should always apply standard precautions consistently with all patients, regardless of their diagnosis. Droplet precautions should be added to the standard precautions when providing care to patients with symptoms of acute respiratory infection; contact precautions and eye protection should be added when caring for probable or confirmed cases of MERS-CoV infection; airborne precautions should be applied when performing aerosol generating procedures.
MERS-CoV causes more severe disease in people with underlying chronic conditions such as diabetes, renal failure, chronic lung disease, and immunocompromised persons. Therefore, these people should avoid close contact with animals, particularly camels, when visiting farms, markets, or barn areas where the virus is known to be potentially circulating. General hygiene measures, such as regular hand washing before and after touching animals and avoiding contact with sick animals, should be adhered to.
Food hygiene practices should be observed. People should avoid drinking raw camel milk or camel urine, or eating meat that has not been properly cooked.
WHO does not advise special screening at points of entry with regard to this event nor does it currently recommend the application of any travel or trade restrictions.
","Assessment":"Infection with MERS-CoV can cause severe disease resulting in high mortality. Humans are infected with MERS-CoV from direct or indirect contact with dromedary camels. MERS-CoV has demonstrated the ability to transmit between humans. So far, the observed non-sustained human-to-human transmission has occurred mainly in health care settings.
The notification of additional cases does not change the overall risk assessment. WHO expects that additional cases of MERS-CoV infection will be reported from the Middle East, and that cases will continue to be exported to other countries by individuals who might acquire the infection after exposure to animals or animal products (for example, following contact with camels) or human source (for example, in a health care setting). WHO continues to monitor the epidemiological situation and conducts risk assessment based on the latest available information.
Among these 32 cases, 12 cases were part of five distinct clusters (one health care and four household clusters). The details of these clusters are described below and detailed information concerning the cases reported can be found in a separate document (see link below).
From 2012 through 16 September 2018, the total global number of laboratory-confirmed MERS cases reported to WHO is 2254 and 800 associated deaths.
The global number reflects the total number of laboratory-confirmed cases reported to WHO under IHR 2005 to date. The total number of deaths includes the deaths that WHO is aware of to date through follow-up with affected member states.
Follow-up of the household contacts was conducted for all four cases, and no secondary cases were identified.
For the three cases reporting contact with camels, the Ministry of Agriculture was informed, and an investigation of camels was conducted. The identified positive camels were isolated.
The Ministry of Health of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is working to improve testing capacities for better detection of MERS-CoV during the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.
","FurtherInformation":"Citable reference: World Health Organization (16 November 2022). Disease Outbreak News; Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) – Saudi Arabia. Available at: https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2022-DON422
","Summary":"From 29 December 2021 to 31 October 2022, four laboratory-confirmed cases of Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) were reported to WHO by the Ministry of Health of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. No deaths were reported. Household contacts for the four cases were followed-up by the Ministry of Health, and no secondary cases were identified. The notification of these cases reiterates the need for global awareness of MERS-CoV but does not change the overall risk assessment. ","PublicationDateAndTime":"2022-11-16T19:00:27Z","TitleSuffix":"","UseOverrideTitle":true,"Title":"Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus \u2013Saudi Arabia","Epidemiology":"Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) is a viral respiratory infection caused by a coronavirus called Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV). Approximately 36% of patients with MERS have died, but this may be an overestimate of the true mortality rate, as mild cases of MERS-CoV may be missed by existing surveillance systems, with case fatality rates counted only amongst the laboratory-confirmed cases.
Humans are infected with MERS-CoV from direct or indirect contact with dromedary camels who are the natural host and zoonotic source of the virus. MERS-CoV has demonstrated the ability to transmit between humans. So far, the observed non-sustained human-to-human transmission has occurred among close contacts and in healthcare settings. Outside of the healthcare setting, there has been limited human-to-human transmission.
MERS-CoV infections range from showing no symptoms (asymptomatic) or mild respiratory symptoms to severe acute respiratory disease and death. A typical presentation of MERS-CoV disease is fever, cough, and shortness of breath. Pneumonia is a common finding, but not always present. Gastrointestinal symptoms, including diarrhoea, have also been reported. Severe illness can cause respiratory failure that requires mechanical ventilation and support in an intensive care unit. The virus appears to cause more severe disease in older people, persons with weakened immune systems and those with comorbidities or chronic diseases such as renal disease, cancer, chronic lung disease, and diabetes.
No vaccine or specific treatment is currently available, although several MERS-CoV-specific vaccines and treatments are in development. Treatment is supportive and based on the patient’s clinical condition and symptoms.
","OverrideTitle":"Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus \u2013 Saudi Arabia","Advice":"Based on the current situation and available information, WHO re-emphasizes the importance of strong surveillance by all Member States for acute respiratory infections, including MERS-CoV, and to carefully investigate any unusual patterns.
Human-to-human transmission of MERS-CoV in healthcare settings has been associated with delays in recognizing the early symptoms of MERS-CoV infection, slow triage of suspected cases and delays in implementing infection, prevention and control (IPC) measures. IPC measures are therefore critical to prevent the possible spread of MERS-CoV between people in health care facilities. Healthcare workers should always apply standard precautions consistently with all patients, at every interaction in healthcare settings. Droplet precautions should be added to the standard precautions when providing care to patients with symptoms of acute respiratory infection; contact precautions and eye protection should be added when caring for probable or confirmed cases of MERS-CoV infection; airborne precautions should be applied when performing aerosol-generating procedures or in settings where aerosol-generating procedures are conducted. Early identification, case management and isolation of cases, follow-up and quarantine of contacts, together with appropriate IPC measures in health care setting and public health awareness can prevent human-to-human transmission of MERS-CoV.
MERS-CoV appears to cause more severe disease in people with underlying chronic medical conditions such as diabetes, renal failure, chronic lung disease, and immunocompromised persons. Therefore, people with these underlying medical conditions should avoid close contact with animals, particularly dromedaries, when visiting farms, markets, race tracks or slaughterhouses where the virus may be circulating. General hygiene measures, such as regular hand washing before and after touching animals and avoiding contact with sick animals, should be adhered to.
Food hygiene practices should be observed. People should avoid handling or consuming raw camel milk or camel urine or eating meat that has not been properly cooked.
WHO does not advise special screening at points of entry regarding this event, nor does it currently recommend the application of any travel or trade restrictions.
","Assessment":"Between September 2012 and 17 October 2022, the total number of laboratory-confirmed MERS-CoV infection cases reported globally to WHO is 2600 with 935 associated deaths. Most of these cases have occurred in countries in the Arabian Peninsula. There has been one large outbreak outside of the Middle East in May 2015, during which 186 laboratory-confirmed cases (185 in the Republic of Korea and 1 in China) and 38 deaths were reported, however, the index case in that outbreak had a travel history to the Middle East. The global number reflects the total number of laboratory-confirmed cases reported to WHO under IHR (2005) to date. The total number of deaths includes the deaths that WHO is aware of to date through follow-up with affected Member States.
The notification of the four cases does not change the overall risk assessment. WHO expects that additional cases of MERS-CoV infection will be reported from the Middle East and/or other countries where MERS-CoV is circulating in dromedaries, and that cases will continue to be exported to other countries by individuals who were exposed to the virus through contact with dromedaries or their products (for example, consumption of camel’s raw milk), or in a healthcare setting. WHO continues to monitor the epidemiological situation and conducts risk assessments based on the latest available information.
The number of MERS-CoV cases reported to WHO has substantially declined since the beginning of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. This is likely the result of epidemiological surveillance activities for COVID-19 being prioritized, resulting in reduced testing and detection of MERS-CoV cases. In addition, measures taken during the COVID-19 pandemic to reduce SARS-CoV-2 transmission (e.g. mask-wearing, hand hygiene, physical distancing, improving the ventilation of indoor spaces, respiratory etiquette, stay-at-home orders, reduced mobility) are also likely reduce opportunities for onward human-to-human transmission of MERS-CoV. However, the circulation of MERS-CoV in dromedary camels is not likely to have been impacted by these measures. Therefore, while the number of reported secondary cases of MERS has been reduced, the risk of zoonotic transmission remains.
","Overview":null,"DonId":"2022-DON422","FormattedDate":"16 November 2022"},{"Id":"5f0ef10e-d106-48f7-858d-e702ef1a16f2","LastModified":"2021-07-04T08:01:35Z","PublicationDate":"2021-06-04T11:23:33Z","DateCreated":"2021-07-04T08:01:35Z","IncludeInSitemap":true,"SystemSourceKey":null,"UrlName":null,"ItemDefaultUrl":"/2009_06_29-en","Response":"","FurtherInformation":"","Summary":"","PublicationDateAndTime":"2009-06-29T00:00:00Z","TitleSuffix":"","UseOverrideTitle":false,"Title":"Influenza A(H1N1) - update 55","Epidemiology":null,"OverrideTitle":"","Advice":"","Assessment":"","Overview":null,"DonId":"","FormattedDate":"29 June 2009"},{"Id":"673e3edb-ef57-49cb-96a3-072f623fada3","LastModified":"2024-01-25T10:15:23Z","PublicationDate":"2023-04-11T13:10:25Z","DateCreated":"2023-04-11T13:10:25Z","IncludeInSitemap":true,"SystemSourceKey":null,"UrlName":null,"ItemDefaultUrl":"/2023-DON456","Response":"The Chinese government has taken the following monitoring, prevention, and control measures:
Citable reference: World Health Organization (11 April 2023). Disease Outbreak News; Avian Influenza A (H3N8) – China. Available at https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2023-DON456
","Summary":"On 27 March 2023, the National Health Commission of the People\u2019s Republic of China notified WHO of one confirmed case of human infection with an avian influenza A(H3N8) virus. This is the third reported case of human infection with an avian influenza A(H3N8) virus; all three cases have been reported from China.\r\n\r\nEpidemiological investigation and close contact tracing have been carried out. There have been no other cases found among close contacts of the infected individual.\r\n\r\nBased on available information, it appears that this virus does not have the ability to spread easily from person to person, and therefore the risk of it spreading among humans at the national, regional, and international levels is considered to be low. However, due to the constantly evolving nature of influenza viruses, WHO stresses the importance of global surveillance to detect virological, epidemiological and clinical changes associated with circulating influenza viruses which may affect human (or animal) health. ","PublicationDateAndTime":"2023-04-11T18:00:00Z","TitleSuffix":"","UseOverrideTitle":true,"Title":"Avian Influenza A(H3N8)","Epidemiology":"Zoonotic influenza infections in humans may be asymptomatic or may cause disease. Depending on factors related to the specific virus and the infected host, disease can range from conjunctivitis or mild flu-like symptoms to severe acute respiratory disease or even death. Gastrointestinal or neurological symptoms have been reported but these are rare.
Human cases of infection with avian influenza viruses are usually the result of direct or indirect exposure to infected live or dead poultry or contaminated environments.
","OverrideTitle":"","Advice":"To minimize the risk of infection, countries should increase public awareness of the importance of avoiding contact with high-risk environments such as live animal markets/farms, live poultry, or surfaces that may be contaminated by poultry or bird faeces. It is recommended to maintain good hand hygiene by frequently washing hands or using alcohol-based hand sanitizer and wearing respiratory protection when in a risky environment.
Given the observed extent and frequency of avian influenza cases in wild birds and some wild mammals, the public should avoid contact with animals that are sick or dead from unknown causes and should report the occurrence to the authorities.
Travellers to countries with known outbreaks of animal influenza should avoid farms, contact with animals in live animal markets, entering areas where animals may be slaughtered, or contact with any surfaces that appear to be contaminated with animal faeces or other body fluids. Travellers should also wash their hands often with soap and water and follow good food safety and good food hygiene practices.
WHO advises against the application of travel or trade restrictions based on the information available at this time.
Influenza viruses are constantly evolving and large outbreaks occur among animal populations, which is why WHO stresses the importance of global surveillance to detect any changes in virology, epidemiology, and clinical patterns associated with emerging or circulating influenza viruses, which may pose a threat to human or animal health. Collaboration between the animal and human health sectors is essential. As the extent of influenza viruses circulation in animals is not clear, epidemiologic and virologic surveillance and the follow-up of suspected human cases should continue systematically. Timely sharing of information is critical for risk assessment.
The variety of zoonotic influenza viruses that have led to human infections is worrying and demands increased surveillance in both animal and human populations, as well as a comprehensive examination of each zoonotic infection, and planning for pandemics. To prevent a viral mutation that could make human-to-human transmission easier, poultry workers have been recommended to receive seasonal influenza vaccination.
If a human infection with a novel influenza virus that has pandemic potential, such as avian influenza, is confirmed or suspected, even before receiving confirmatory laboratory results, contact tracing should be immediately initiated. A thorough epidemiological investigation should be conducted, including a history of travel and exposure to animals . The investigation should also involve early identification of unusual clusters of respiratory disease that could indicate person-to-person transmission of the novel virus. Clinical samples collected from the time and place that the case occurred should be tested, and then sent to a WHO Collaborating Centre for further characterization.
Close analysis of the epidemiological situation, further characterization of the most recent viruses found in humans and poultry, and serological investigations, are critical to assess risk and to adjust risk management measures in a timely manner.
Under the International Health Regulations (IHR 2005), States Parties are required to immediately notify WHO of any laboratory-confirmed case of human infection caused by a new subtype of influenza virus. Investigation, virus sharing, and genetic and antigenic characterization of every human infection are essential.
This event does not change the current recommendations from WHO for public health measures and surveillance of influenza.
","Assessment":"Avian influenza A(H3N8) viruses are commonly detected globally in animals. Influenza A(H3N8) viruses are some of the most commonly found subtypes in birds, causing little to no sign of disease in either domestic poultry or wild birds. Cross-species transmission of A(H3N8) avian influenza viruses has been reported for various mammal species, including being endemic in dogs and horses.
This is the third reported human infection with A(H3N8) from China. Two previous cases were reported in April and May 2022. One of the previous cases developed a critical illness, while the other had a mild illness. Both cases likely acquired infection from direct or indirect exposure to infected poultry. So far, no additional cases linked with this case, nor the previous cases, have been reported. According to reports from health officials, the preliminary epidemiological investigation into this event suggests that exposure to a live poultry market may have been the cause of infection. However, it is still unclear what the exact source of this infection is and how this virus is related to other avian influenza A(H3N8) viruses that are circulating in animals. To better understand the current risk to public health, more information is needed from both human and animal investigation.
The transmission of avian influenza viruses from birds to humans is usually sporadic and happens in a specific context: most human infections with avian influenza viruses that have been reported previously were due to exposure to infected poultry or contaminated environments. Since avian influenza viruses continue to be detected in poultry populations, further sporadic human cases are expected in the future.
The available epidemiological and virological information suggests that avian influenza A(H3N8) viruses do not have the capacity for sustained transmission among humans. Therefore, the current assessment is that the likelihood of human-to-human spread is low. However, due to the constantly evolving nature of influenza viruses, WHO continues to stress the importance of global surveillance to detect virologic, epidemiologic and clinical changes associated with circulating influenza viruses which may affect human (or animal) health.
","Overview":null,"DonId":"2023-DON456","FormattedDate":"11 April 2023"},{"Id":"928c13e1-f2a0-4125-a2fb-7b0e50847862","LastModified":"2021-07-04T07:58:41Z","PublicationDate":"2014-05-15T00:00:00Z","DateCreated":"2021-07-04T07:58:41Z","IncludeInSitemap":true,"SystemSourceKey":null,"UrlName":null,"ItemDefaultUrl":"/2014_05_15_mers-en","Response":"","FurtherInformation":"","Summary":"","PublicationDateAndTime":"2014-05-15T00:00:00Z","TitleSuffix":"","UseOverrideTitle":false,"Title":"Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) \u2013 update","Epidemiology":null,"OverrideTitle":"","Advice":"","Assessment":"","Overview":null,"DonId":"","FormattedDate":"15 May 2014"},{"Id":"1fe25bb8-2a96-477f-a92b-f0f8645d093e","LastModified":"2021-07-04T06:58:48Z","PublicationDate":"2007-07-30T00:00:00Z","DateCreated":"2021-07-04T06:58:48Z","IncludeInSitemap":true,"SystemSourceKey":null,"UrlName":null,"ItemDefaultUrl":"/2007_07_30-en","Response":"","FurtherInformation":"","Summary":"","PublicationDateAndTime":"2007-07-30T00:00:00Z","TitleSuffix":"","UseOverrideTitle":false,"Title":"Poliomyelitis in Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo","Epidemiology":null,"OverrideTitle":"","Advice":"","Assessment":"","Overview":null,"DonId":"","FormattedDate":"30 July 2007"},{"Id":"727e8067-0aff-44c8-93ea-4a63644eb8aa","LastModified":"2021-07-04T07:28:12Z","PublicationDate":"2021-06-07T14:04:22Z","DateCreated":"2021-07-04T07:28:12Z","IncludeInSitemap":true,"SystemSourceKey":null,"UrlName":null,"ItemDefaultUrl":"/1999_06_25-en","Response":"","FurtherInformation":"","Summary":"","PublicationDateAndTime":"1999-06-25T00:00:00Z","TitleSuffix":"","UseOverrideTitle":false,"Title":"1999 - Malaria in Burundi","Epidemiology":null,"OverrideTitle":"","Advice":"","Assessment":"","Overview":null,"DonId":"","FormattedDate":"25 June 1999"},{"Id":"dc198c95-23a2-411b-8d12-bb1e3b92754c","LastModified":"2023-11-08T16:24:19Z","PublicationDate":"2016-04-21T00:00:00Z","DateCreated":"2021-06-03T09:54:06Z","IncludeInSitemap":true,"SystemSourceKey":null,"UrlName":null,"ItemDefaultUrl":null,"Response":null,"FurtherInformation":null,"Summary":null,"PublicationDateAndTime":"2016-04-21T00:00:00Z","TitleSuffix":null,"UseOverrideTitle":true,"Title":null,"Epidemiology":"","OverrideTitle":"Zika virus disease \u2013 Peru","Advice":"The proximity of mosquito vector breeding sites to human habitation is a significant risk factor for Zika virus infection. Prevention and control relies on reducing the breeding of mosquitoes through source reduction (removal and modification of breeding sites) and reducing contact between mosquitoes and people. This can be achieved by reducing the number of natural and artificial water-filled habitats that support mosquito larvae, reducing the adult mosquito populations around at-risk communities and by using barriers such as insect screens, closed doors and windows, long clothing and repellents. Since the Aedes mosquitoes (the primary vector for transmission) are day-biting mosquitoes, it is recommended that those who sleep during the daytime, particularly young children, the sick or elderly, should rest under mosquito nets (bed nets), treated with or without insecticide to provide protection. Mosquito coils or other insecticide vaporizers may also reduce the likelihood of being bitten.
During outbreaks, space spraying of insecticides may be carried out following the technical orientation provided by WHO to kill flying mosquitoes. Suitable insecticides (recommended by the WHO Pesticide Evaluation Scheme) may also be used as larvicides to treat relatively large water containers, when this is technically indicated.
Basic precautions for protection from mosquito bites should be taken by people traveling to high risk areas, especially pregnant women. These include use of repellents, wearing light colored, long sleeved shirts and pants and ensuring rooms are fitted with screens to prevent mosquitoes from entering.
Although the risk of transmission of Zika virus through sexual activity is considered to be very limited, based on precautionary principles, WHO recommends the following:
Independently of considerations regarding Zika virus, WHO always recommends the use of safer sexual practices, including the correct and consistent use of condoms to prevent HIV, other sexually transmitted infections and unwanted pregnancies.
WHO does not recommend routine semen testing to detect Zika virus.
WHO does not recommend any travel or trade restriction to Peru based on the current information available.
","Assessment":"Sporadic cases of infection acquired following sexual activity have already been reported in the past. These cases of sexual transmission do not change the overall risk assessment since the virus continues to be primarily transmitted to people through mosquito bites. The risk of a global spread of Zika virus to areas where the competent vectors, the Aedes mosquitoes, are present is significant, given the wide geographical distribution of these mosquitoes in various regions of the world. WHO continues to monitor the epidemiological situation and conduct risk assessment based on the latest available information.
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