Situation at a glance
Description of the situation
On 29 November 2024, the Ministry of Public Health of the Democratic Republic of the Congo reported to WHO an alert regarding increased deaths from an undiagnosed cause in Panzi health zone.
Between 24 October and as of 5 December 2024, Panzi health zone in Kwango Province has recorded 406 cases of an undiagnosed disease with symptoms of fever, headache, cough, runny nose and body ache and 31 deaths (Case Fatality Ratio or CFR of 7.6%). The reported cases had a peak in epidemiological week 45 (week ending 9 November 2024). The outbreak is still ongoing. According to a press briefing by the Ministry of Health on 5 December, there have been several additional deaths outside of health facilities (community deaths). These deaths still need to be investigated, characterized (age, gender etc) and verified.
Cases have been reported from nine out of 30 health areas in Panzi health zone: Kahumbulu, Kambandambi, Kanzangi, Kasanji, Kiama, Mbanza Kipungu, Makitapanzi, Mwini ngulu, and Tsakala Panzi. The majority of cases (95.8%) are reported from Tsakala Panzi (169), Makitapanzi (142) and Kanzangi (78) health areas.
In Panzi health zone, children aged 0-14 years represent 64.3% of all reported cases, with the age groups 0-59 months, 5-9 years, and 10-14 years accounting for 53%, 7.4%, and 3.9% of cases, respectively. Females constitute 59.9% of the total cases. Among the deaths, 71% are below the age of 15, with 54.8% of the total in children under the age of five years. All severe cases were reported to be malnourished. There are 145 cases aged 15 and above, of which nine died (CFR: 6.2%). Deaths have primarily occurred in the village communities.
The area experienced deterioration in food insecurity in recent months, has low vaccination coverage and very limited access to diagnostics and quality case management. There is a lack of supplies and transportation means and shortage of health staff in the area. Malaria control measures are very limited.
The clinical presentation of patients includes symptoms such as fever (96.5%), cough (87.9%), fatigue (60.9%) and a running nose (57.8%). The main symptoms associated with death include difficulty in breathing, anaemia, and signs of acute malnutrition. Based on the current context of the affected area and the broad presentation of symptoms, a number of suspected diseases need to be ruled out through further investigations and laboratory testing. These include but are not limited to measles, influenza, acute pneumonia (respiratory tract infection), hemolytic uremic syndrome from E. coli, COVID-19, and malaria.
Public health response
1. Leadership and coordination:
- Coordination has been strengthened at the national, provincial, and community levels. On 30 November 2024, the first Public Health Emergency Operations Center (PHEOC) meeting was held with all partners to address the alert, after which a rapid response team (RRT) from Kwango Province was deployed to Panzi. On 3 December 2024, a second PHEOC meeting was convened with partners, leading to the decision to deploy a national-level RRT to Panzi with support from WHO.
- Daily coordination meetings are being held at the national level, with provincial teams actively participating in ongoing planning and response.
2. Surveillance:
- A case definition has been developed based on clinical symptoms observed, which is guiding surveillance and reporting efforts.
- Active case search is being conducted in health facilities, including reviews of hospital registers to identify additional cases. Investigations and active case search are also being organized in the community.
- Data collection is ongoing, focusing on the preparation of a line list and detailed epidemiological analysis.
- Community deaths are being investigated to better understand transmission dynamics and the scope of the outbreak.
3. Case Management:
- A provincial RRT was deployed to Panzi on 30 November, and a multidisciplinary RRT from the national level, including WHO experts, was deployed on 7 December to investigate the outbreak, and reinforce the response.
- The teams are carrying medication to support case management and prevent more deaths.
- Efforts are underway to strengthen capacity of healthcare providers to ensure the best possible care for patients.
4. Laboratory:
- Laboratory equipment was transported to collect samples from cases and send for testing at INRB in Kinshasa. Additionally, RDTs for malaria and COVID-19 have been provided to assist in diagnosis.
5. Risk communication and community engagement:
- Key messages have been developed to enhance public awareness and encourage general preventive behaviors. These messages are being disseminated through community engagement, with sensitization campaigns underway.
6. Infection prevention and control:
- Infection prevention and control measures are being reinforced. Health and care workers have been briefed on key practices, including the proper use of masks, hand washing, and gloves, to reduce the risk of further transmission.
7. Logistics
- Logistical support is being provided for effective case management, including the transportation of samples to INRB Kinshasa for laboratory testing. Health facilities and hospitals in the most affected health areas are being supplied with appropriate medications and sampling kits to support the response.
WHO risk assessment
There are ongoing efforts to address the outbreak in Panzi health zone, however significant challenges in the clinical and epidemiological response remain, that increase the public health risk for the affected population. Severe cases with anaemia, respiratory distress, and malnutrition have been reported. The affected area is remote, complicating the assessment and response. The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) for acute food insecurity levels in Kwango province increased from IPC 1 (acceptable) in April 2024 to IPC 3 (Crisis Level) in September 2024. This suggests a significant phase of increase in food insecurity and risk of severe acute malnutrition.
Symptoms such as fever, cough, headache, and body ache have been observed since 24 October, primarily through health worker reports, yet Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response (IDSR) data on baseline respiratory illness rates are not available for affected health zone to establish trends. Cases have been reported in family clusters, suggesting potential transmission dynamics within households, though additional investigation is needed. Furthermore, there is no information available on specific vaccination coverage, including childhood vaccination, in the affected health zone, leading to uncertainties about vaccine-deprived population immunity.
Gaps in case management have also been identified. Stock-outs of medications for treating common diseases frequently occur, and care is not provided free of charge, which could limit access to treatment for vulnerable populations.
The affected area’s remoteness and logistical barriers, including a two-day road journey from Kinshasa due to the rainy season affecting the roads and limited mobile phone and internet network coverage across the health areas, have hampered the rapid deployment of response teams and resources. Furthermore, there is no functional laboratory in the health zone or province, requiring the collection and shipment of samples to Kinshasa for analysis. This has delayed diagnosis and response efforts. The lack of sample collection supplies has further limited diagnostic capacity, leaving significant gaps in understanding the outbreak’s aetiology.
Insecurity in the region adds another layer of complexity to the response. The potential for attacks by armed groups poses a direct risk to response teams and communities, which could further disrupt the response.
Based on the above rationale, the overall risk level to the affected communities is assessed as high.
At the national level, the risk is considered moderate due to the localized nature of the outbreak within the Panzi health zone in Kwango province. However, the potential for spread to neighboring areas, coupled with gaps in surveillance and response systems, this assessment underscores the need for heightened preparedness.
At the regional and global levels, the risk remains low at this time. However, the proximity of the affected area to the border with Angola raises concerns about potential cross-border transmission, and continued monitoring and cross-border coordination will be essential to mitigate this risk.
The current confidence in the available information remains moderate, as significant gaps in clinical, epidemiological, and laboratory data persist.
WHO advice
To reduce the impact of the
outbreak in the Panzi health zone and mitigate further spread, WHO advises the
following measures:
Strengthening coordination
mechanisms at all levels—national, provincial, zonal, and local—is critical for
a unified response. Enhanced communication infrastructure, such as satellite
phones, is required to overcome the limited network coverage in affected areas.
Cross-border collaboration with Angola is also crucial to monitor for similar
cases and prevent potential cross-border transmission.
Improving surveillance efforts
is a priority to identify and respond to cases promptly. Active case searches
should continue in both health facilities and communities, with a particular
focus on areas reporting deaths and family clusters. Community-based
surveillance must be strengthened to ensure early case detection and rapid
response.
Careful characterization of
the clinical syndrome and outcomes and an improved case definition based on the
information collected will be necessary to understand the situation. In
particular, data which clarify possibility of coinfection and multiple pathologies,
and uncertainties in outcomes among vulnerable groups should be collected. The
WHO has established the Global Clinical Platform to provide rapid turnaround of
structured data analysis using anonymized case records; its use is recommended in
the detailed capture of patient syndromes and outcomes.
Effective case management requires ensuring an adequate
supply of essential medications to support treatment and prevent more deaths.
RDTs for malaria should be distributed to facilitate differential diagnosis,
while laboratory testing must be expedited through the shipment of samples to
INRB Kinshasa to confirm or rule out suspected causes, including COVID-19 and
influenza. Long-term laboratory capacity strengthening, and decentralization
will be important in provision of diagnostic capability in the affected health
zone.
Infection prevention and
control (IPC) measures must be reinforced across all health facilities.
Healthcare workers should receive training on IPC practices, including the
proper use of personal protective equipment (PPE) such as masks and gloves, as
well as strict hand hygiene protocols. These measures will reduce transmission
risks within health facilities and improve the safety of healthcare
delivery.
Risk communication and
community engagement are essential to raising public awareness. Targeted
messages should be disseminated to educate the public on respiratory illness
symptoms, preventive measures, and the importance of seeking care early.
Community leaders must be engaged to build trust and encourage adherence to
public health guidance. Addressing misinformation and fears within the
community is critical to ensuring effective collaboration in the
response.
Logistical and security
challenges also require attention. Strengthening logistical support for the
deployment of teams and supplies will ensure timely access to affected areas.
Contingency plans should be developed to address potential insecurity posed by
armed groups, safeguarding response personnel and maintaining continuity in
response activities.
Further investigations are needed to clarify whether anaemia
observed in severe cases is linked to the outbreak. The main hypothesis of
respiratory illness should be validated by studying its relationship with
seasonal influenza and other potential factors. Additionally, historical
outbreaks, such as that of typhoid fever which was reported in the health zone
two years ago, should be reviewed to identify recurring vulnerabilities that
may inform current response efforts. In addition, understanding general
malnutrition rates and identifying cases of acute malnutrition in the affected
population can inform appropriate nutritional care and prevent further
deaths.
Further information
- Democratic Republic of the Congo Ministry of Health Press Release: https://x.com/i/broadcasts/1YqGovjjrwAKv?s=09
- Democratic Republic of the Congo: Acute Malnutrition Situation For July - December 2024 and Projection for January - June 2025 https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1157190/?iso3=COD
Citable reference: World Health Organization (8 December 2024). Disease Outbreak News; Undiagnosed disease – Democratic Republic of the Congo. Available at: https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2024-DON546