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Harnessing innovation and fostering responsible use of life sciences

4 March 2025
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In response to the rapid developments in life sciences and emerging technologies, ease of access, diversity of actors and sectors, and gaps in governance of biorisks from dual-use research of concern (DURC), WHO facilitated an online meeting of partners, collaborators, and other stakeholders on 3 December 2024.  The participants were sensitized on the WHO Global guidance framework for the responsible use of the life sciences: mitigating biorisks and governing dual-use research and WHO’s support for improving biosafety and biosecurity within national laboratory systems.

The meeting was attended by 66 laboratory scientists and experts from Indian Council of Medical Research, National Center for Disease Control, All India Institutes of Medical Sciences and Research (AIIMS) and other leading medical institutes, vaccine manufacturers, and programme-networked laboratories, including Viral Research and Diagnostic Laboratory Network, Polio laboratory network, Measles & Rubella Laboratory Network, and Vaccine Preventable Diseases Surveillance Laboratory Network of India. All three levels of WHO – headquarters, South East Asia Regional Office (SEARO), and WHO Country Office for India, also participated.

DURC describes research that is intended to provide a clear benefit, but which could easily be misapplied to do harm because of its potential to create negative consequences for health and safety, agriculture, the environment, or national security. One example is research into viruses and other pathogens. Modified versions of dangerous viruses created in laboratories to study how they behave in humans and animals have the potential to cause great harm if not controlled correctly or used to intentionally infect people or animals.

Several reports, including one on South East Asia Strategic Multilateral Biosecurity Dialogue,  have shown gaps in biosafety and biosecurity regimes, including the lack of limited policies, training, and resources in WHO SEAR. The implementation of the framework in SEAR can contribute to strengthening health research governance, reinforcing biosafety and biosecurity regimes, and fostering ethics and research integrity through the development of new measures or by leveraging existing policies and systems.

Scientists from WHO Science Division highlighted the need to proactively engage with researchers and provide governance tools to Member States to optimize the benefits and mitigate the risks of DURC through customizing the operationalization of the framework in the country’s context, specificity and needs.

Many laboratories in India have national and international accreditations and strong internal, external audit systems inherent to their operations to ensure biosafety and biosecurity. A comprehensive national policy and regulatory framework, and improved coordination among policy makers, global partners, research institutions and law enforcers can further strengthen biosafety and security. Improving resources and enhancing awareness and information-sharing on security concerns can further help address challenges that limit biorisk mitigation and DURC governance.

Flexible training programmes, curriculum on the potential of misuse of DURC or “gain of function” research, strengthened institute ethics and biosafety committees with inclusion of all stakeholders were identified as key steps for the implementation of the WHO framework. Capacity building, infrastructure modifications and improved national and international coordination were also identified as priority areas for bioirisk mitigation and DURC governance.